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INTRODUCTION 
Following the assassination of leading Russian opposition 
politician Boris Efimovich Nemtsov on February 27, 2015, 
international media and others speculated on the Russian 
government’s degree of involvement, if any, in the murder.1 A year 
later, Mr. Nemtsov’s allies assert that the culprit will likely never be 
found due to a Kremlin-orchestrated cover-up.2  Leaving aside the 
question of who, if anyone, ordered the killing, this Note asserts that 
Russian State acts or omissions regarding Mr. Nemtsov’s reputation 
in Russian society were a proximate cause of his assassination, and 
                                                                                                             
1. See, e.g., Owen Matthews, Who Really Killed Boris Nemtsov?, NEWSWEEK (Mar. 23, 
2015, 9:22 AM), http://www.newsweek.com/who-really-killed-boris-nemtsov-315705 
(outlining disputes over Kremlin involvement in the murder); Catherine A. Fitzpatrick, 
Reichstag Redux: The Boris Nemtsov Murder Conspiracy Theories, DAILY BEAST (Mar. 1, 
2015, 3:23 PM),  http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/03/01/who-killed-boris-nemtsov-
a-rundown-of-the-conspiracy-theories.html (describing the main theories of Mr. Nemtsov's 
murder, including four mutually exclusive theories put forth by federal investigators); J. Paul 
Goode, The Question to Ask About Boris Nemtsov’s Murder is not Who but Why?, WASH. 
POST (Mar. 3, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2015/03/03/
the-question-to-ask-about-boris-nemtsovs-murder-is-not-who-but-why/ (noting that “For 
Nemtsov’s supporters and admirers, the Kremlin’s brand of hateful, anti-opposition and ‘fifth 
column’ propaganda serves as explanation” for Mr. Nemtsov's killing). 
2. Id.; Shaun Walker, Boris Nemtsov murder investigators name Chechen mastermind, 
GUARDIAN (Dec. 29, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/29/boris-nemtsov-
investigators-name-chechen-mastermind (noting opposition leader Ilya Yashin's allegation that 
“investigators are carrying out a political order to cover up the real culprits”); Sarah Rainsford, 
Boris Nemtsov killing: Grief, fear and anger one year on, BBC NEWS (Feb. 27, 2016), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35675221 (quoting Nemtsov family counsel Vadim 
Prokhorov as fearing a “cover-up”).  
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that since these acts or omissions were violative of Russian and 
international law, his family has the right to seek damages in a 
defamation action at one of the international human rights tribunals 
whose jurisdiction Russia recognizes. The Note concludes that both 
the United Nations Human Rights Committee (“Committee”), the 
tribunal attached to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (“ICCPR”); and the European Court of Human Rights 
(“European Court”), the tribunal attached to the European Convention 
on Human Rights (“ECHR”), are proper venues given not only the 
explicit protections to reputation contained in the former treaty and 
implicit protections in the latter, but also the sheer obviousness of Mr. 
Nemtsov’s case. 
This Note pursues the case of Boris Nemtsov to explore the 
concept of character assassination as a counterpart to guaranteed 
protections to honor and reputation in Russian and international law. 
In response to liberal objections based on freedom of expression 
concerns, this Note takes the position of the Supreme Court of the 
Russian Federation (“Supreme Court”) as it pertains to defamation in 
the press, which is that speech is a proper subject of administrative 
regulation.3  
Mr. Nemtsov was edged out of the most influential Russian 
political circles as his criticism of the government of Vladimir 
Vladimirovich Putin grew stronger in the years leading up to his 
murder.4 This was largely a result of the fact that media that were or 
                                                                                                             
3. Пленум Верховного Суда Российской Федерации, Постановление от 24 февраля 
2005 г. N 3, О судебной практике по делам о защите чести и достоинства граждан, а 
также деловой репутации граждан и юридических лиц (Plenum of the Supreme Court of 
the Russian Federation of Feb. 24, 2005 No. 3, On Juridical Practice in Cases of the 
Protection of Honor and Dignity of Citizens, as well as Business Reputation of Citizens and 
Legal Entities) [hereinafter Plenary Directive], ¶ 4 (“The protection of honor, dignity, and 
business reputation from untrue, defamatory statements constitutes a necessary restriction of 
the freedoms of expression and of the media in cases of abuse of these rights.”). This and all 
subsequent translations from Russian to English are by the author. 
4. Andrew E. Kramer, Fear Envelops Russia After Killing of Putin Critic Boris Nemtsov, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 28, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/01/world/europe/killing-of-
boris-nemtsov-putin-critic-breeds-fear-in-russia.html (describing Mr. Nemtsov's status as 
dissident years after serving as a deputy prime minister); Isabella Kolar, “Wer stirbt zuerst: 
Putin oder Russland?”: Interview mit Boris Nemzow (“Who Dies First: Putin or Russia?”: 
Interview with Boris Nemtsov), DEUTSCHLANDRADIO KULTUR (Jan. 18, 2014), 
http://www.deutschlandradiokultur.de/interview-mit-boris-nemzow-von-2014-wer-stirbt-
zuerst-putin.979.de.html (interview with German radio in which Mr. Nemtsov quips of fears 
that he will be killed). 
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are fully or substantially owned by the Russian government engaged 
in a concerted effort to destroy Mr. Nemtsov’s credibility and 
reputation in the final two years of his life, painting him as an 
“enemy” of Russia aligned with insidious non-Russian interests in a 
bid to destabilize the country. 5  This Note explores the right to 
reputation provisions of the ICCPR as the source of a strong case at 
the Committee, which oversees compliance with that treaty but also 
acts as a tribunal on claims of State violations of Covenant provisions, 
with a cause of action based on this media campaign.6 The Note also 
sees the protections to reputation built into the ECHR’s privacy 
provision — though not as clear as the protections in the ICCPR — as 
a strong basis for a successful claim at the European Court, which 
oversees compliance with that treaty. 7  But given both tribunals’ 
                                                                                                             
5. Ivan Nechepurenko, Analysts Blame Nemtsov's Death on Russia's ‘Legitimized Hate’, 
MOSCOW TIMES (Feb 28, 2015), http://www.themoscowtimes.com/article.php?id=516716 
(quoting political scientist Alexei Makarkin stating that Mr. Nemtsov's killing demonstrates 
how “hatred has been legitimized or even sanctioned in Russia”); Liubov Borusyak and 
Aleksei Levinson, Анатомия ненависти: как возникло посткрымское единство россиян 
(Anatomy of Hate: What Happened to Russian Unity Post-Crimea), RBK (Mar. 18, 2015, 4:14 
PM), http://www.rbc.ru/opinions/society/18/03/2015/550973de9a7947327e5f3a1c (describing 
the “fifth column” theory); Maria Lipman, Putin’s Enemy Within: Demonising the “Fifth 
Column”, EUROPEAN COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Mar. 26, 2015), http://www.ecfr.eu/article/
commentary_putins_enemy_within_demonising_the_fifth_column311513 (further describing 
the “fifth column” theory of Russian opposition politics). 
6. G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (Dec. 19, 1966) [hereinafter First Optional Protocol], art. 1 (“A State Party to 
the Covenant that becomes a Party to the present Protocol recognizes the competence of the 
Committee to receive and consider communications from individuals subject to its jurisdiction 
who claim to be victims of a violation by that State Party of any of the rights set forth in the 
Covenant.”). 
7. Compare Annex to G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (Dec. 16, 1966) [hereinafter ICCPR] art. 17 (“1. No one shall be subjected to 
arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to 
unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation. 2. Everyone has the right to the protection of 
the law against such interference or attacks.”) with Council of Europe, European Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as amended by Protocols Nos. 
11 and 14 (Nov. 4, 1950), E.T.S. No. 5 [hereinafter European Convention or ECHR] art. 8 (“1. 
Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this 
right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in 
the interests of national security, public safety or the economic wellbeing of the country, for 
the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection 
of the rights and freedoms of others.”); ECHR, art. 19 (“To ensure the observance of the 
engagements undertaken by the High Contracting Parties in the Convention and the Protocols 
thereto, there shall be set up a European Court of Human Rights, hereinafter referred to as ‘the 
Court’. It shall function on a permanent basis.”). 
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domestic exhaustion requirements, explained below, Mr. Nemtsov’s 
representatives would first have to sue in the Russian court system.8 
In that connection, this Note explains the Russian federal statutes 
treating defamation, including a relevant provision of the Russian 
Constitution.9 
Notably, Russia recognizes the jurisdiction of multiple 
international human rights tribunals, while its Constitution protects 
reputation and honor analogously to the ICCPR provision on right to 
reputation — and even more firmly than the ECHR.10 Also, Russia 
constitutionally guarantees the freedoms of expression, association, 
and privacy, among others. 11  Many provisions of the Human and 
Civil Rights and Freedoms section of the Russian Constitution are 
nearly identical to the equivalent provisions of the ECHR and the 
ICCPR.12 
A successful regional and national politician in the final 
moments of the Soviet government and in the subsequent Russian 
government of President Boris Nikolaevich Yeltsin, Mr. Nemtsov was 
central to the introduction of capitalism to the Russian economy 
following the dissolution of the Soviet Union..13 Mr. Nemtsov later 
became a prominent and acerbic critic of the Russian government 
under President Putin (and of Mr. Putin personally), asserting that the 
Russian government was taking a turn for the authoritarian.14 He also 
                                                                                                             
8. Infra Part II(3)(b-c). 
9. Infra Part II. 
10. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
11. КОНСТИТУЦИЯ РOССИЙСКОЙ ФEДЕРАЦИИ [КОНСТ. РФ] [CONSTITUTION] (Russ.) 
[hereinafter KRF] art. 29 (“1. Everyone shall be guaranteed the freedom of ideas and 
speech.”); art. 30 (“1. Everyone shall have the right to association, including the right to create 
trade unions for the protection of his. The freedom of the activities of public associations shall 
be guaranteed.”); art. 23 (“1. Everyone has the right to the inviolability of private life, personal 
and family secrets, and the protection of his honor and good name. 2. Everyone has the right to 
privacy of his correspondence, telephone conversations, mail, telegraph, and other messages. 
Limitations to this right are permitted only by court order.”). 
12. See infra note 109 and accompanying text. 
13. Yelena Dikun, Profile of Boris Nemtsov: Russia's Newest First Deputy Premier, 
JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION (Apr. 18, 1997, 3:00 AM), http://www.jamestown.org/single/
?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=19613&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=219#.Vo6
Pxyospsc (providing the general contours of Mr. Nemtsov's political career from the late 1980s 
through mid 1990s); Jonathan Steele, Boris Nemtsov Obituary, GUARDIAN (March 1, 2015, 
1:31 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/01/boris-nemtsov (calling Mr. 
Nemtsov a  “leading pro-market reformer in the first, tumultuous post-Soviet decade”). 
14 . Steele, supra note 13 (noting Mr. Nemtsov's opposition to Kremlin policy); 
Prominent Russians: Boris Nemtsov, RUSSIAPEDIA, http://russiapedia.rt.com/prominent-
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claimed a culture of unbridled malversation in Russia, which was 
further illustrated in his multiple publications beginning in 2008.15 
Given the Putin government’s perceived tolerance of political 
killings, in early 2015 Mr. Nemtsov went on the record with fears that 
Mr. Putin would arrange his murder.16 
The same month, Mr. Nemtsov was shot several times on 
Moscow’s Bolshoi Moskvoretsky Bridge, just steps from the Kremlin 
walls – one of the most heavily surveilled areas in all of Russia.17 
Bullets struck his head, heart, liver, and stomach.18 He died at the 
scene only hours after calling on the public to march in protest of 
Russia’s ongoing military engagement in Ukraine.19 About a week 
later, two men from Russia’s volatile North Caucasus region were 
                                                                                                             
russians/politics-and-society/boris-nemtsov/ (last visited Jan. 7, 2016) (noting Mr. Nemtsov's 
participation in mass anti-Putin demonstrations). 
15. See generally VLADIMIR MILOV & BORIS NEMTSOV, PUTIN. RESULTS. 10 YEARS: 
THE INDEPENDENT EXPERT REPORT (2010) (alleging widespread corruption touching the 
upper echelons of Russian society); NATIONAL FREEDOM PARTY, PUTIN. CORRUPTION. THE 
INDEPENDENT EXPERT REPORT (2011) (alleging same).  
16.  Борис Немцов: Боюсь того, что Путин меня убьет (Boris Nemtsov: I Fear that 
Putin Will Kill Me), SOBESEDNIK (Feb. 10, 2015), https://web.archive.org/web/
20150301202856/http://sobesednik.ru/politika/20150210-boris-nemcov-boyus-togo-chto-
putin-menya-ubet (describing Mr. Nemtsov's comments regarding the possibility of his 
assassination); Russia opposition politician Boris Nemtsov shot dead, BBC NEWS (Feb. 28, 
2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-31669061 (noting Mr. Nemtsov's stated fears 
that the Kremlin would arrange his killing). 
17. Прохоров: Немцов погиб как мужчина (Prokhorov: Nemtsov Died Like a Man), 
RIA NOVOSTI (Feb. 28, 2015), http://ria.ru/society/20150228/1050174998.html (describing 
Mr. Nemtsov's murder); Убийство Бориса Немцова: вся хроника субботы (The Murder of 
Boris Nemtsov: A Full Chronology of Saturday), MOSKOVSKIJ KOMSOMOLETS (Feb. 28, 
2015), http://www.mk.ru/politics/2015/02/28/ubiystvo-borisa-nemcova-vsya-poslednyaya-
informaciya-onlayntranslyaciya.html (providing a timeline of the moments following Mr. 
Nemtsov's murder); Борис Немцов погиб от пули, попавшей в сердце (Boris Nemtsov Killed 
by a Bullet to the Heart), L!FE NEWS (Feb. 28, 2015), http://lifenews.ru/news/150510 
(reporting Mr. Nemtsov's assassination). See also ул. Большой Москворецский мост 
(Bolshoi Moskvoretsky Bridge Street), GOOGLE MAPS, https://www.google.com/
maps/place/ul.+Bolshoy+Moskvoretskiy+most,+Moskva,+Russia/@55.7494048,37.620296,17
z/data=!4m2!3m1!1s0x46b54af8bcce78ad:0xb4a432d1fc127aa2 (showing the Bolshoi 
Moskvoretsky Bridge and its placement roughly 75 feet from the Kremlin walls). 
18. See id. 
19 . See supra note 2 and accompanying text. Boris Nemtsov (@BorisNemtsov), 
TWITTER (Feb. 27, 2015, 9:36 PM), https://twitter.com/BorisNemtsov/status/
571378284933619713 (providing the route of the planned anti-war march). 
2016] THE CASE FOR BORIS NEMTSOV 1295 
arrested and charged with Mr. Nemtsov’s murder. 20  Documented 
irregularities in those arrests have been a subject of international 
discussion and inquiry, including at the Committee.21 
As Mr. Nemtsov increased his criticism of Russia’s 2014 
annexation of Crimea and troop incursion in Ukraine, Russian media 
began a major campaign to discredit him.22 A key feature of this 
campaign was the clear placement of Mr. Nemtsov in a cabal of 
supposed “national traitors” who were allegedly beholden to insidious 
non-Russian interests and bent on destabilizing the country.23  Mr. 
Nemtsov was regularly described in major media as a leader of the 
“fifth column,” a sinister group of Western-backed interloper-
agitators in Russian society.24 This media campaign has also been 
noted in discussions at the Committee.25 On one occasion, then-Prime 
Minister Putin publicly accused Mr. Nemtsov of being a political 
opportunist who had stolen massive amounts of money from state 
coffers in the 1990s, and who was seeking once again to “line his 
pockets.”26 
                                                                                                             
20. Walker, supra note 2 (describing the arrests connected to Mr. Nemtsov's killing); 
Rainsford, supra note 2 (noting the arrests of Chechen men in purported connection to Mr. 
Nemtsov's murder). 
21. U.N. Hum. Rights Council, Communications Report of Special Procedures Sent, 1 
March to 31 May 2015; Replies received, 1 May to 31 July 2015, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/30/27 
(Sept. 4, 2015) [hereinafter Special Procedures Report] at 11 (“The Government has opened an 
investigation into his death; however Government officials have made public judgments in 
relation to the killing that may prejudice the investigation.”). 
22. Nechepurenko, supra note 5 (describing media efforts to discredit Mr. Nemtsov); 
Special Procedures Report, supra note 21, at 11 (noting that Mr. Nemtsov “had been accused 
by State media and public officials of being an ‘enemy of Russia.’”) 
23. В Рунете запустили сайт со списком «предателей Родины» (On RuNet, List of 
“National Traitors” Launches), LENTA.RU (Mar. 7, 2014), http://lenta.ru/news/2014/03/07/
predatel/ (noting Mr. Nemtsov's rhetorical placement among alleged “traitors” of Russia); 
Борис Немцов – предатель: независимое расследование (Boris Nemtsov, the Traitor: 
Independent Investigation), NEWSLAND (Dec. 30, 2011), http://newsland.com/news/detail/
id/854794/ (dubious report purporting to show Mr. Nemtsov's “betrayal” of Russia); Борис 
Немцов – предатель России (Boris Nemtsov: Traitor to Russia), POLITIKUS.RU (Jan. 9, 
2012), http://politikus.ru/video/105-boris-nemcov-predatel-rossii.html (pseudo-documentary 
purporting to prove Mr. Nemtsov's alignment with anti-Russian forces). 
24. See id.; Lipman, supra note 5. 
25. Special Procedures Report, supra note 21, at 11 (“Mr. Nemtsov was previously 
arrested in connection with his role in peaceful protests and had been accused by State media 
and public officials of being an ‘enemy of Russia.’”). 
26. Путин призвал не допустить во власть тех, кто “поураганил” в 90-е годы 
(Putin Urges to Keep from Power Those Who “Churned” In the 1990s), RIA NOVOSTI (Dec. 
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The media atmosphere in Russia has been characterized as one 
of “legitimized hate” following the campaign to discredit Mr. 
Nemtsov and others like him.27 In Russia, television media – which is 
nearly universally owned by Kremlin-friendly entities – is the primary 
source of information.28 There is nothing to substantiate any claim 
that the Kremlin called on national media to discontinue or even 
soften the allegations of Mr. Nemtsov’s collusion with non-Russian 
powers in a bid to subvert the stability of the country. For these 
reasons, Mr. Nemtsov’s family has recourse under the right to 
reputation provisions of the Russian Constitution, the Russian 
Criminal and Civil Codes, the ICCPR, and the privacy provision of 
the ECHR.29 
Part I of this Note gives a brief history of Mr. Nemtsov’s place 
in Russian politics and society generally in order to demonstrate his 
stature. It begins with his late Soviet political activism in Nizhny 
Novgorod, then called Gorky, an industrial hub 400 kilometers (250 
miles) east of Moscow. It then discusses his ascendancy through elite 
Russian politics during the post-Soviet Russian government of Mr. 
Yeltsin, which corresponds roughly to the 1990s. Finally, it explains 
Mr. Nemtsov’s marginalization following well-documented 
publications purporting to expose corruption and other features of the 
Putinist system of governance. 
Part II discusses protections to reputation and honor, including 
liability for defamation generally. This begins by briefly addressing 
legal academic understandings of defamation, and is followed by 
                                                                                                             
16, 2010), http://ria.ru/politics/20101216/309511640.html (quoting Prime Minster Putin's 
comments regarding Mr. Nemtsov's political motivations in the 1990s and the present day). 
27. Nechepurenko, supra note 5 (describing the media-fueled atmosphere of “legitimized 
hate” in modern Russia). 
28. Кому принадлежат основные СМИ в России (Who Owns Major Media in Russia), 
RIA NOVOSTI (Jan. 27, 2012), http://ria.ru/infografika/20120127/550041009.html (infographic 
showing Russian television, print, and radio media as majority owned (in terms of number of 
outlets) by government agencies, State-owned entities, and instrumentalities of the City of 
Moscow); Кто владеет СМИ в России: ведущие холдинги (Who Owns the Media in Russia: 
Leading Holdings), BBC RUSSIAN BUREAU (July 11, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/russian/
russia/2014/07/140711_russia_media_holdings (describing Russian government holdings in 
media, as well as the holdings of state-held entities); see also Svetlana Pasti, Mikhail 
Chernysh, & Luiza Svitich, Russian Journalists and Their Profession, in THE GLOBAL 
JOURNALIST IN THE 21ST CENTURY 267, 268 (David H. Weaver and Lars Willnat eds., 2012) 
(noting the holdings of the Kremlin and State-owned entities in Russian media). 
29. See infra note 109 and accompanying text. 
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Russian and international statutory law. It refers to relevant provisions 
of the Russian Constitution and Criminal and Civil Codes, as well as 
to analogous provisions in the ICCPR and ECHR. It also includes an 
examination of the domestic Russian and international recourse 
available to Russian nationals who face attacks on their reputation, 
with Mr. Nemtsov in mind. 
Part III considers the practical application of the laws discussed 
in Part II. For example, this Part discusses some procedural 
restrictions to the international human rights tribunals. Also included 
is a brief discussion of the legal status of Committee Views, the 
Committee’s rulings on ICCPR violation complaints. Further, this 
Part outlines right to reputation jurisprudence at the Supreme Court, 
the Committee, and the European Court in order to illustrate how 
those courts treat the concept. 
Given Russia’s domestic and international statutory obligations 
to protect its nationals from attacks on their honor and reputation, this 
Note argues in Part IV that Mr. Nemtsov's family should begin the 
litigation process within the Russian court system against individual 
media outlets for their defamatory claimsSuch a suit could be filed 
based on Russian constitutional, criminal, and civil law, but with a 
view to continuation if necessary at one of the two international 
human rights tribunals whose jurisdiction Russia recognizes. 
Acknowledging the sheer strength of Mr. Nemtsov’s case, the 
fundamental question for his representatives is one of recourse should 
the case reach an international tribunal. In the case that his 
representatives favor money damages for the Russian media’s slander 
campaign against Mr. Nemtsov in the final years of his life, the 
European Court of Human Rights would be the preferable forum.30 
But, in the case that they prefer public refutations of the allegations 
that constituted this campaign in the very media that broadcast the 
claims in the first place, the United Nations Human Rights Committee 
is the preferable forum.31  All of this assumes, of course, that the 
Russian court system does not provide the quite strong recourse 
available under various sections of the Russian Civil Code and 
Criminal Code, discussed in Part II(2).32 
                                                                                                             
30. See infra Part II(3). 
31. See infra Part II(2). 
32. See infra Part II(2). 
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To be clear, this Note does not assert that there are any clear 
grounds to sue the Russian government in direct relation to Mr. 
Nemtsov’s murder. It also takes no position on the rightness or 
wrongness of Mr. Nemtsov’s activities or political stances as a leader 
of Russia’s government or, later, its opposition movement. Rather, it 
is the project of this Note to demonstrate how the Russian 
government is liable in tort for acts and, more importantly, omissions 
facilitating a political atmosphere that observers agree was a 
proximate cause of Mr. Nemtsov’s murder regardless of who pulled 
the trigger. 
Given the protections to reputation in Russian law, the ICCPR, 
and the ECHR, the Russian government would ultimately be liable as 
a result of the defamation cause of action outlined here even if Mr. 
Nemtsov were still alive today.33  In that connection, the intended 
readership of this Note is first and foremost Mr. Nemtsov’s 
representatives including legal counsel, and the international tribunal 
of their choice should they choose to litigate a defamation claim at 
that tribunal. To a lesser extent, this Note touches on questions of 
Russian defamation law in both the civil and criminal contexts in a 
manner that could be of interest for students of international, foreign, 
and comparative public law. 
I: A SHORT BIOGRAPHY OF BORIS E. NEMTSOV 
Born in Sochi in 1959 and raised in Gorky (today, Nizhny 
Novgorod), Boris Nemtsov graduates the Physics Department of 
Gorky State University (today’s Lobachevsky State University of 
Nizhny Novgorod) in 1981.34 In 1985, at 25 years old, he defends a 
Ph.D. in Physics and Mathematics at the same institute. 35  In the 
following years he publishes prolifically on thermodynamics and 
                                                                                                             
33.  Infra Parts II-III. 
34. Nemtsov Boris (Efimovich), ACADEMIC.RU (2006), http://dic.academic.ru/dic.nsf/
fin_enc/25740/Немцов [hereinafter ACADEMIC.RU] (providing a timeline of Mr. Nemtsov's 
life from 1959-2006); Биография Бориса Немцова (Biography of Boris Nemtsov), RIA 
NOVOSTI (Feb, 28, 2015), http://ria.ru/spravka/20150228/1050127398.html [hereinafter 
Biography of Boris Nemtsov] (describing Mr. Nemtsov's academic life).  
35. Biography of Boris Nemtsov, supra note 34 (describing Mr. Nemtsov's academic life); 
Биография Бориса Немцова (Biography of Boris Nemtsov), TASS (Feb, 28, 2015), 
http://tass.ru/info/1798210 [hereinafter Biography of Boris Nemtsov (TASS)] (noting Mr. 
Nemtsov's doctoral work at Gorky State). 
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acoustics questions as a fellow at the Radiophysical Research 
Institute, also in Gorky-cum-Nizhny Novgorod.36 
He enters electoral politics in 1989 in a losing bid for People’s 
Deputy of the Soviet Union.37 In 1990, Mr. Nemtsov runs as a Gorky 
representative to the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Republic.38 The 
only non-Communist candidate, he is elected as a member of the 
Democratic Russia bloc.39 President Yeltsin appoints Mr. Nemtsov 
governor of the Nizhny Novgorod Region the same year; he is elected 
to a second term in the post in 1995 with nearly sixty percent of the 
vote.40 
Governor Nemtsov oversees a regional reform program through 
the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the early post-Soviet period.41 
Chaotic free-market policies rule, and when there is not enough 
currency available, Mr. Nemtsov issues his own to be exchanged later 
for Russian rubles. 42  The Nizhny Novgorod region experiences a 
unique level of economic growth during this period, drawing 
significant foreign direct investment.43 
In 1993, Mr. Nemtsov is elected to the Federation Council — the 
upper house of the Federal Assembly, Russia’s parliament — with 
                                                                                                             
36 . List of Publications by Boris E. Nemtsov, HARVARD UNIVERSITY SAO/NASA 
ASTROPHYSICS DATA SYSTEM, http://adsabs.harvard.edu/cgi-bin/nph-abs_connect?return_
req=no_params&author=Nemtsov,%20B.%20E.&db_key=PHY  (showing 42 articles and 
abstracts of Mr. Nemtsov's academic work on topics including, for example, “Linear 
interaction of waves in a magnetoplasma in the presence of periodic inhomogeneities”). 
37. Biography of Boris Nemtsov (TASS), supra note 35 (describing Mr. Nemtsov's early 
political activities); Dikun, supra note 13 (describing same). 
38. Id.  
39. Id. 
40 . Dikun, supra note 13 (noting Mr. Nemtsov's popular election following 
appointment); Biography of Boris Nemtsov (TASS), supra note 35 (noting Mr. Nemtsov's 
1995 election). 
41 . Biography of Boris Nemtsov (TASS), supra note 35 (describing the Nizhny 
Novgorod region reforms under Mr. Nemtsov's direction); Yuri Artemev, Три Жизни 
“Немцовок” (The Three Lives of the “Nemtsovki”), BONISTIKA, http://www.bonistikaweb.ru/
nemcovka.htm (last visited Jan. 11, 2016) (discussing reforms in Nizhny Novgorod during Mr. 
Nemtsov's stewardship). 
42. Artemev, supra note 41 (discussing the “Nemtsovki,” the regional currency issued 
under Mr. Nemtsov's direction); Serge Schmemann, The Brilliant Boris Nemtsov: A Reformer 
Who Never Backed Down, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 2, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/
03/03/opinion/the-brilliant-boris-nemtsov-a-reformer-who-never-backed-down.html (noting 
the regional currency issued during the period).  
43. Dikun, supra note 13 (noting unique economic growth in Nizhny Novgorod during 
Mr. Nemtsov's term); Schmemann, supra note 42 (noting same). 
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support from Russia’s Choice and Yabloko, at that time the country’s 
chief liberal political parties. 44  Through the mid-1990s, political 
observers speculate that President Yeltsin will name Mr. Nemtsov as 
his successor, with Western press calling him a “top young 
reformer.”45 In March 1995, Mr. Nemtsov is awarded the Medal of 
Service to the Fatherland, Russia's highest civilian decoration.46 
In 1997, Mr. Nemtsov is named First Deputy Prime Minister of 
the Russian Federation.47 Some press report that in a meeting with 
United States President Bill Clinton, President Yeltsin refers to Mr. 
Nemtsov as his chosen successor.48 Summer 1997 opinion polls show 
that half of Russians would support Mr. Nemtsov in the 2000 
presidential election.49  
Mr. Nemtsov and other free-market reformers fall out of public 
favor, though, when the Russian stock market crashes in 1998 and 
Russia defaults on its sovereign debt. 50  The subsequent economic 
crisis expands into a major general political crisis.51  In December 
1998 Mr. Yeltsin dissolves the government, and Mr. Nemtsov is 
                                                                                                             
44. ACADEMIC.RU, supra note 34 (describing Mr. Nemtsov's election to the Federation 
Council); Biography of Boris Nemtsov (TASS), supra note 35 (noting Mr. Nemtsov's support 
from mainstream liberal parties). 
45. Geoffrey York, Yeltsin Recruits Top Young Reformer Nemtsov, GLOBE AND MAIL 
(Mar. 1997), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/from-the-archives-yeltsin-recruits-
top-young-reformer-nemtsov/article23235987/ (referring to Mr. Nemtsov as a “top young 
reformer”); Steele, supra note 13 (stating that Mr. Nemtsov had been “earmarked by President 
Boris Yeltsin as his successor”). 
46. ПРЕЗИДЕНТ РОССИИ, УКАЗ ПРЕЗИДЕНТА РФ N 260 “О НАГРАЖДЕНИИ МЕДАЛЬЮ 
ОРДЕНА “ЗА ЗАСЛУГИ ПЕРЕД ОТЕЧЕСТВОМ” II СТЕПЕНИ” (ОТ 10 МАРТА 1995 Г.) (PRESIDENT 
OF RUSSIA, DECREE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE RF NO. 260, AWARDING THE MEDAL “FOR 
SERVICE TO THE FATHERLAND,” II DEGREE (MAR. 10, 1995)), http://kremlin.ru/
acts/bank/7627. 
47. ACADEMIC.RU, supra note 34 (noting Mr. Nemtsov's appointment to the post); York, 
supra note 45 (noting Mr. Nemtsov's position as First Deputy Prime Minister). 
48. Gregory L. White, Boris Nemtsov’s Career Traces Arc of Russia’s Dimmed Hopes 
for Democracy, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 28, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/boris-nemtsovs-
career-traces-arc-of-russias-dimmed-hopes-for-democracy-1425168024 (noting claims that 
President Yeltsin had named Mr. Nemtsov as his successor to foreign heads of state); Steele, 
supra note 13 (stating that Mr. Nemtsov had been “earmarked by President Boris Yeltsin as his 
successor”). 
49 . Kolar, supra note 4 (noting Summer 1997 popular support for Mr. Nemtsov); 
Nemtsov, Boris, LENTA.RU ARCHIVE, http://lenta.ru/lib/14160327/full/ (last visited Jan. 11, 
2016) (describing Mr. Nemtsov's apparent trajectory towards the Presidency of Russia). 
50. Steele, supra note 13 (describing the political implications of the Russian default); 
Biography of Boris Nemtsov (TASS), supra note 35 (describing same). 
51. Id. 
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forced to resign as Deputy Prime Minister.52 A year later, President 
Yeltsin unexpectedly resigns in a televised address on December 31, 
1999. 53  In his speech, a kind of apology for the chaos that 
characterized Russia’s transition from Soviet rule, Mr. Yeltsin tells 
the Russian people, simply, “I seek your forgiveness, that many of our 
dreams did not come true.”54 He notifies them in the address that in 
accordance with the Constitution, the presidency is to be handed 
provisionally to Prime Minister Vladimir V. Putin.55 
In January 2000, Mr. Nemtsov co-authors an op-ed about interim 
President Putin in The New York Times entitled Russia’s Best Bet.56 
“Russia could do considerably worse than have a leader with an 
unwavering commitment to the national interest,” Mr. Nemtsov and 
Eurasia Group head Ian Bremmer write. 57  Following this period, 
though, Mr. Nemtsov becomes increasingly critical of President 
Putin’s policies.58 In January 2004, he co-authors an article warning 
the Russian masses of an incipient Putinist dictatorship.59 
In November 2007, Mr. Nemtsov is one of several dozen 
protesters arrested while chanting “Russia without Putin!” near St. 
Petersburg’s Winter Palace. 60  The protest is a week ahead of 
                                                                                                             
52. Id. 
53. Обращение Президента Б.Н. Ельцына к гражданам России 31 декабря 1999 
года (Address of President B.N. Yeltsin to the Citizens of Russia, December 31, 1999), 
DELOVAYA PRESSA (Jan. 10, 2000), http://www.businesspress.ru/newspaper/article_mId_
33_aId_4812.html (full text of President Yeltsin's resignation speech); Ilya Karpyuk, Речь 
Ельцына 31.12.1999 (Speech of Yeltsin 31.12.1999), YOUTUBE (Apr. 25, 2007), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yvSpiFvPUP4 (full video of President Yeltsin's 
resignation speech). 
54. Id.; Текст новогоднего обращения Бориса Ельцина (Text of New Year's Address 
by Boris Yeltsin), BBC RUSSIAN BUREAU (Dec. 31, 1999), http://www.bbc.com/
russian/address.htm (including Mr. Yeltsin's apology for dreams forsaken). 
55. Id. 
56. Boris Nemtsov and Ian Bremmer, Russia's Best Bet, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 5, 2000), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2000/01/05/opinion/russia-s-best-bet.html (“Russia could do 
considerably worse than have a leader with an unwavering commitment to the national 
interest.”). 
57. Id. 
58. White, supra note 48 (outlining Mr. Nemtsov's relations with the Russian leadership 
over time); Vladimir Kara-Murza and Boris Nemtsov, Об угрозе путинизма (On the Threat 
of Putinism), NEZAVISIMAJA GAZETA (Jan. 22, 2004), http://www.ng.ru/politics/2004-01-
22/3_letter.html (asserting the danger of a return to authoritarianism under President Putin). 
59. Kara-Murza and Nemtsov, supra note 58 (open letter “to those who cannot put a 
price on freedom and democracy”). 
60. Police Arrest Scores at Opposition Rally in Russia, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 25, 2007), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/25/world/europe/25iht-russia.4.8470583.html (noting Mr. 
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parliamentary elections. 61  More than a dozen parliamentary 
candidates are seen in attendance at the rally. 62  “So many police 
proves they are afraid of us,” Mr. Nemtsov tells the press following 
his release.63 
On May 7, 2008, Dmitry Anatolevich Medvedev replaces 
Vladimir Putin as President of Russia.64 Mr. Medvedev's first move as 
executive is to appoint Mr. Putin prime minister. 65  While the 
Medvedev presidency is seen as more liberal than that of Mr. Putin, 
the latter is understood as the more powerful of the two, and the term 
“tandemocracy” becomes a fashionable characterization of the 
Russian style of governance during the period. 66  Political and 
sociological histories of Russia generally assert that Mr. Putin 
maintains effective control of the country during the Medvedev 
presidency.67 
In March 2009, Mr. Nemtsov announces that he will run for 
mayor of Sochi, his birth city, in elections the following month.68 He 
                                                                                                             
Nemtsov's participation in mass rallies); Boris Nemtsov (b_nemtsov), LIVEJOURNAL (Nov. 24, 
2007), http://b-nemtsov.livejournal.com/12082.html?thread=1063218 (describing his arrest). 
61. Id. 
62. Id. 
63. Police Arrest Scores at Opposition Rally in Russia, supra note 60. 
64 . Medvedev becomes Russia's leader, BBC NEWS (May 7, 2008), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7386940.stm (reporting on Mr. Medvedev's election to the 
Russian Presidency); Michael Stott and Oleg Shchedrov, Russia's Medvedev takes power and 
pledges freedom, REUTERS (May 7, 2008), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-
inauguration-idUSL0649335020080507 (reporting same). 
65. Id. 
66. Ilan Berman, Inscrutable Russian ‘Tandemocracy’, WASH. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2010), 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/oct/15/inscrutable-russian-tandemocracy/ 
(describing the general features of the “tandemocracy”); see also ANNA ARUTUNYAN, THE 
PUTIN MYSTIQUE: INSIDE RUSSIA’S POWER CULT (2014), at Introduction (explaining that 
under the “tandemocracy,” Russia was “de jure” ruled by Dmitry Medvedev but “de facto” 
ruled by “Prime Minister Vladimir Putin”); see generally Henry E. Hale and Timothy J. 
Colton, Russians and the Putin-Medvedev “Tandemocracy”: A Survey-Based Portrait of the 
2007-08 Election Season, NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR EURASIAN AND EAST EUROPEAN 
RESEARCH (Sept. 8, 2009) (employing the “tandemocracy” model as the status quo descriptor 
of late-2000s Russian politics). 
67. Id. 
68 . Немцов зарегистрирован кандидатом в мэры Сочи (Nemtsov Registers as 
Mayoral Candidate in Sochi), LENTA.RU (Mar. 28, 2009), http://lenta.ru/news/2009/
03/28/nemtsov/ (reporting Mr. Nemtsov's entry to the Sochi mayoral race); Adrian Blomfield, 
Alexander Lebedev joins race to be Russian mayor, TELEGRAPH (Mar. 18, 2009), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/5011403/Alexander-Lebedev-
joins-race-to-be-Russian-mayor.html (noting Mr. Nemtsov's candidacy for Mayor of Sochi). 
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is attacked with ammonium chloride outside his office by pro-
Kremlin activists shortly thereafter, and asserts to the press his belief 
that the attack is in retaliation to his criticism of plans to hold the 
Winter 2014 Olympic Games in Sochi. 69  Mr. Nemtsov loses the 
mayoral election.70 
In March 2010, a group of prominent members of the Russian 
intelligentsia publish an open letter calling for Prime Minister Putin’s 
removal from the Russian government. 71  They urge the Russian 
people “from Kaliningrad to Vladivostok” to demonstrate against Mr. 
Putin.72 Mr. Nemtsov is a signatory.73  
In June 2010, Mr. Nemtsov and Vladimir Stanislavovich Milov, 
who had served as Deputy Minister of Energy during President 
Putin’s first term, publish one million copies of a report entitled 
Putin: Results. 10 Years.74 The fourth report in the Putin: Results. 
series begun in 2008, it advertises the Putin Must Go campaign on its 
inside back cover.75 Police seize hundreds of thousands of copies of 
the report, alleging “extremist” content.76 The day after publication, 
the report’s website falls victim to cyber attack.77 Some of the report’s 
                                                                                                             
69. Joshua Keating, Interview: Boris Nemtsov, FOREIGN POL’Y (Mar. 1, 2010), 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2010/03/01/interview-boris-nemtsov/ (noting the chemical attack on 
Mr. Nemtsov); Simon Shuster, Why Russia’s Probe Into the Nemtsov Murder Does Not Stack 
Up, TIME (Mar. 10, 2015), http://time.com/3738734/nemtsov-murder-investigation/ (noting the 
2009 attack on Mr. Nemtsov). 
70. Борис Немцов оспорит результаты выборов мэра Сочи в суде (Boris Nemtsov 
Disputes Sochi Mayoral Election Results in Court), LENTA.RU (Apr. 27, 2009), 
http://lenta.ru/news/2009/04/27/sud/ (describing Mr. Nemtsov's loss in the Sochi mayoral 
election); На выборах мэра Сочи лидирует кандидат от “Единой России” (United Russia 
Candidate Leads in Sochi Mayoral Elections), LENTA.RU (Apr. 27, 2009), http://lenta.ru/news/
2009/04/26/results/ (reporting on the election of the ruling United Russia Party candidate as 
Mayor of Sochi). 
71. Путин должен уйти! (Putin Must Go!), EZHEDNEVNYIJ ZHURNAL (Mar. 11, 2010), 
http://www.ej.ru/?a=note&id=9935# (the open letter announcing the initiation of the Putin 
Must Go! movement). 
72. Id. 
73. Id. 
74. Milov & Nemtsov, supra note 15. 
75. Id. 
76 . Police seize 100,000 anti-Vladimir Putin books, TELEGRAPH (June 16, 2010), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/7833181/Police-seize-100000-anti-
Vladimir-Putin-books.html (describing police seizure of Mr. Nemtsov's reports). 
77. Сайты Немцова и Милова подверглись атаке после публикации нового доклада 
(Sites of Nemtsov and Milov Under Attack Following Publication of New Report), GRANI.RU 
(June 15, 2010), http://grani.ru/Internet/m.178982.html (noting cyberattacks on the websites of 
Mr. Nemtsov and Mr. Milov). 
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chapters include “Corruption is Eroding Russia,” “A Dying Country,” 
“A Country of Screaming Inequality,” “Pension Collapse,” “The 
Multibillion-Dollar Scam” (regarding the Sochi Winter Olympic 
Games), and others of similar tone.78 
In December 2010, during a live televised address, Prime 
Minister Putin accuses a group including Mr. Nemtsov of stealing 
“many billions” from public coffers during the 1990s.79 Mr. Putin 
asserts that the political activism of Mr. Nemtsov and others who 
oppose the sitting Russian government is simply a bid to return to 
power in order to “line their pockets.”80 On New Year’s Eve 2010, 
Mr. Nemtsov is arrested at an anti-government rally in Moscow.81 He 
is sentenced to fifteen days in prison, spending Russia’s most 
important civil holiday behind bars. 82  Following his release, Mr. 
Nemtsov’s January 2011 defamation action against Prime Minister 
Putin is dismissed: the ruling holds that names like “Boris Nemtsov” 
simply refer metonymically to “a certain class of political actor” and 
that, therefore, the televised allegations are not actionable.83 
In March 2011, Messrs. Nemtsov and Milov release the report 
Putin: Corruption, the fifth in the Putin: Results. series.84 The report 
documents the riches of the Russian political class, including 26 
palaces and five yachts used by President Medvedev and Prime 
Minister Putin. 85  Chapters include “Putin and His Billionaire 
                                                                                                             
78. Id. 
79. Putin Urges, supra note 26 (alleging without context that Mr. Nemtsov stole from the 
Russian people during his tenure as an appointed and elected official). 
80. Id. 
81. Michael Schwirtz, Arrests in Russia Signal Divisions Over Dissent, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 
3, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/04/world/europe/04russia.html (reporting Mr. 
Nemtsov's arrest at a mass rally); Opposition leaders detained during Moscow New Year’s Eve 
rally, RADIO FRANCE INT’L (Dec. 31, 2010), http://www.english.rfi.fr/europe/20101231-
opposition-leaders-detained-during-moscow-new-year-s-eve-rally (reporting Mr. Nemtsov's 
New Year's Eve arrest). 
82 . Schwirtz, supra note 81 (noting the sentence levied against Mr. Nemtsov); 
Opposition leaders detained, supra note 81 (reporting same). 
83 . Борис Немцов стал именем нарицательным (Boris Nemtsov Becomes a 
Household Name), KOMMERSANT (Feb. 24, 2011), http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/1590640 
(reporting Judge Adamova's ruling regarding Mr. Putin's allegations against Mr. Nemtsov). 
84. PUTIN. CORRUPTION, supra note 15.  
85. Id. 
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Friends,” “Watches,” “Apartments and Cars,” and others in the same 
vein.86  
In 2011 and 2012, Mr. Nemtsov becomes increasingly active in 
street protests.87 He also begins making appearances to United States 
and European Union legislatures, urging rule of law measures 
regarding Russia including sanctions and travel bans on individual 
members of the Putin government.88 As his political criticisms grow 
louder through 2013, Mr. Nemtsov is threatened with various criminal 
charges.89 
On March 18, 2014, Russia annexes Crimea, an historically 
significant peninsula on the Black Sea, from Ukraine, which is in the 
midst of a civil war.90 Mr. Nemtsov is one of the most prominent 
                                                                                                             
86 . НЕЗАВИСИМЫЙ ЕКСПЕРТНЫЙ ДОКЛАД: ПУТИН. КОРРУПЦИЯ (INDEPENDENT 
EXPERT REPORT: PUTIN. CORRUPTION) 2 (V.  Milov, B. Nemtsov, V. Ryzhova, & O. Shornoj 
eds., 2012). 
87 . Чем запомнился Борис Немцов? (For What is Boris Nemtsov Remembered?), 
ARGUMENTY I FAKTY (Feb. 28, 2015), http://www.aif.ru/dontknows/file/chem_zapomnilsya_
boris_nemcov (noting Mr. Nemtsov's participation in street politics); Boris Nemtsov, 
Резолюция 15 сентября (Resolution of September 15), EKHO MOSKVY (Sept. 13, 2012), 
http://echo.msk.ru/blog/nemtsov_boris/929726-Ekho/ (blog post discussing participation in 
mass anti-Putin rallies). 
88. Вслед за “списком Магнитского” в Европе появятся списки Ходорковского и 
Немцова (Following the “Magnitsky List” in Europe, Come the Khodorkovsky and Nemtsov 
Lists), PRAVO.RU (Feb. 17, 2011), http://pravo.ru/news/view/48584/ (reporting Mr. Nemtsov's 
visit to European Parliament in promotion of sanctions against members of the Russian 
political class); Каспаров с Немцовым передали американским конгрессменам дополнения 
в “список Магницкого”: туда включили Чурова, Бастрыкина и ряд судей (Kasparov and 
Nemtsov Give American Congressmen Additions to the “Magnitsky List,” Including Churov, 
Bastyrkin, and Various Judges), ALTAPRESS.RU (July 6, 2012), http://altapress.ru/story/89165 
(reporting Mr. Nemtsov's lobbying of United States politicians to sanction sitting Russian 
politicians). 
89. Борис Немцов вновь стал фигурантом уголовного дела (Boris Nemtsov Once 
Again Figures in Criminal Case), RBK (Aug. 25, 2012), http://www.rbc.ru/politics/
25/08/2012/666323.shtml (describing battery charges against Mr. Nemtsov); Против Бориса 
Немцова могут возбудить дело по «экстремистской» статье (Against Boris Nemtsov, 
Possible Initiation of Charges under the “Extremism” Article), GAZETA.RU (Sept. 16, 2013), 
http://www.gazeta.ru/politics/news/2013/09/16/n_3187537.shtml (reporting incitement charges 
against Mr. Nemtsov and his political party). 
90. Steven Lee Meyers & Ellen Barry, Putin Reclaims Crimea for Russia and Bitterly 
Denounces the West, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 18, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/19/
world/europe/ukraine.html (reporting Russia's reincorporation of Crimea); Matt Smith & Alla 
Eshchenko, Ukraine cries ‘robbery’ as Russia annexes Crimea, CNN (Mar. 18, 2014), 
http://www.cnn.com/2014/03/18/world/europe/ukraine-crisis/ (reporting same). 
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voices of outrage in Russia regarding the annexation.91 In February 
2015, Mr. Nemtsov tells Russian daily Sobesednik of his fear that 
“Putin will kill me.”92  
Leading up to this time, unsubstantiated claims against Mr. 
Nemtsov amplify in Russian media, in particular allegations that he is 
a traitor to Russia; the Committee takes note.93 On February 27, 2015, 
Mr. Nemtsov tweets to tens of thousands of followers the proposed 
route of an “anti-crisis, anti-war” march in Moscow.94 Hours later he 
is shot six times, more or less on the Kremlin doorstep, dying at the 
scene.95 
II: RIGHT TO REPUTATION IN THE RUSSIAN AND 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
This Part offers background on the Russian and international 
statutory and case law that frame later discussions of liability for 
media attacks on Mr. Nemtsov’s honor and reputation. To provide 
context, it begins with general questions regarding defamation as a 
tort and as an historical legal concept. It continues by specifically 
discussing the right to reputation provision of the Russian 
Constitution and the sections on defamation in the Russian Criminal 
and Civil Codes. Finally, this Part looks at the right to reputation as a 
concept in the ECHR and the ICCPR. That last section of the Part also 
reviews the origins and procedures of the ICCPR’s individual 
complaint mechanism. 
                                                                                                             
91 . Резолюция Марша Мира 21 сентября (Resolution of the Peace March of 
September 21), EKHO MOSKVY (Sept. 21, 2014), http://echo.msk.ru/blog/Ekhomsk/1400978-
Ekho/ (placing Mr. Nemtsov’s among the loudest anti-annexation voices in Russian society). 
92. Milov & Nemtsov, supra note 15. 
93. Special Procedures Report, supra note 21, at 11 (“Mr. Nemtsov was previously 
arrested in connection with his role in peaceful protests and had been accused by State media 
and public officials of being an ‘enemy of Russia.’”). 
94. Nemtsov, supra note 19 (Twitter post giving the route of the planned march). 
95 . Steele, supra note 13 (reporting the known forensic details of Mr. Nemtsov's 
murder); The Murder of Boris Nemtsov, supra note 15 (reporting same); Bolshoi Moskvoretsky 
Bridge Street, supra note 17. 
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1. Defamation Generally 
In the context of international human rights treaties, the right to 
reputation tends to be a subset of the right to privacy.96 Outside the 
treaty context, and not incongruously, it is also discussed as a feature 
of the tort of defamation. 97  This section explores the latter while 
saving close examination of the provisions of the given treaties for 
discussion later on. It also weighs arguments against liability for 
defamation due to freedom of expression concerns. As a general 
point, this Note adopts the commonly held definition of defamation as 
a public communication that negatively affects an individual’s 
reputation.98 In Russian law specifically, klevetā is the umbrella tort 
concept that translates equally as “defamation,” “libel,” and 
“slander,” while a civil defamation claim would be based on 
protections to “dignity, honor, and business reputation” or “intangible 
goods” generally, which statutorily include integrity and good name.99 
Legal academic discussions of defamation often highlight 
concerns relating to the freedom of expression guaranteed in many 
                                                                                                             
96. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948) 
(hereinafter UDHR) art. 12 (“No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his 
privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. 
Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.”); 
ICCPR, supra note 7, at art. 17 (“1. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful 
interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his 
honour and reputation. 2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such 
interference or attacks.”); ECHR, supra note 7, at art. 8 (“1. Everyone has the right to respect 
for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 2. There shall be no 
interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance 
with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, 
public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or 
crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of 
others.”); Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, American Convention on Human 
Rights (Nov. 22 1969) [hereinafter American Convention] art. 11 (“1. Everyone has the right 
to have his honor respected and his dignity recognized. 2. No one may be the object of 
arbitrary or abusive interference with his private life, his family, his home, or his 
correspondence, or of unlawful attacks on his honor or reputation. 3. Everyone has the right to 
the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.”). 
97. See also Jerome H. Skolnick, The Sociological Tort of Defamation, 74 CALIF. L. 
REV. 677 (1986) (placing reputation at the center of the tort concept of defamation); see 
generally Bonnie Docherty, Defamation Law: Positive Jurisprudence, 13 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 
263 (2000) (asserting that the purpose of defamation law is to “protect reputation”).  
98. See Docherty, supra note 97, at 265 (“Defamation is a public communication that 
tends to injure the reputation of another”); TONY WEIR, TORT LAW 162 (2002). 
99. See GKRF, infra note 119. 
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jurisdictions, including Russia.100 These concerns emphasize concepts 
like “open discussion” and the “marketplace of ideas,” relying on the 
cliché of a “free press.” 101  Given Russia’s media ownership 
landscape, where government-linked and -friendly entities have 
effective control over the flow of information, these concerns are a 
distraction. 102  Discussions focused on alleged risks to freedom of 
expression posed by defamation law also assert that freedom of the 
press — which is taken to mean ownership of the press by non-
governmental entities — is necessary for individuals to monitor 
government actions and actors.103  
Defamation is a “social” tort, while reputation is accepted as 
“the esteem in which a person is held by others.”104 Reputation is 
sometimes discussed as either a form of property, or a form of 
honor. 105  Within the property conception, damages are seen as 
payment due to injury to a form of capital linked to an individual’s 
“personal exertion.”106 A market view of society is central to this 
conception of reputation. 107  In a 1986 symposium piece on 
defamation in the California Law Review, Robert C. Post asserts, “No 
person has the right to a reputation other than that created by the 
evaluative process of the market, and, conversely, every person 
enjoys an equal right to enter the market to attempt to achieve what 
reputation he can.”108 Elements of this conception of reputation and 
                                                                                                             
100. See Docherty, supra note 97, at 264 (asserting that defamation liability is inherently 
a restriction on freedom of expression); LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
785-86 (2d ed. 1988) (asserting same). 
101. See generally Docherty, supra note 97 (weighing concerns related to the protection 
of freedom of expression); Tribe, supra note 100. 
102. RIA Novosti, supra note 28 (showing plurality of Kremlin and Kremlin-friendly 
holdings in media); Who Owns the Media in Russia: Leading Holdings, supra note 28 
(showing same). 
103 . See, e.g., Docherty, supra note 97 (referring to the press as a “watchdog”); 
Skolnick, supra note 97, at 679 (discussing various academic positions on the press' duty to 
oversee the conduct of public officials). 
104. See, e.g., Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation 
and the Constitution, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 691 (1986) (asserting that the concept of reputation is 
inseparable from social relations); Skolnick, supra note 97 (stressing the need to examine the 
“social purpose” of defamation law). Reputation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2010). 
105. See Post, supra note 104. 
106. J. HAWES, LECTURES ADDRESSED TO THE YOUNG MEN OF HARTFORD AND NEW 
HAVEN 95 (Hartford 1828); Post, supra note 104, at 695 (developing the property conception). 
107. Post, supra note 104, at 696-97 (discussing the “concept of reputation as property”). 
108. Id. 
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society are pertinent to Mr. Nemtsov’s case, as are elements of the 
“honor” conception. 
In the “honor” notion of reputation, the value of one’s good 
name transcends its potential value in the marketplace.109 A more 
ancient conception, the “honor” understanding of reputation comports 
more closely with Mr. Nemtsov’s case because it considers an 
individual’s specific place in society and the benefits of the social role 
he plays.110 That is, while his place in society may be a result of his 
own efforts, his reputation is a reflection of the regard in which 
society holds that social role.111 Loss of honor, as in Mr. Nemtsov’s 
case, “is a fall from grace in the most comprehensive sense – loss of 
face in the community, but also a loss of self and separation from the 
basic norms that govern human life.”112 In this conception, damages 
for defamation are seen as a method of vindication, or of restoring 
honor.113 Note that both the ICCPR and Russian Constitution and 
Civil Code provisions on the right to reputation refer to “honor,” 
while the Civil Code provision refers additionally to “dignity.”114 
2. Right to Reputation in Russian Federal Statutory Law 
The civil-political and human rights provisions of the Russian 
Constitution often track those of the international human rights 
conventions. 115  This holds true as it concerns the Russian 
                                                                                                             
109. Id. 
110. Proverbs 22:1 (“A good name is more desirable than great riches; to be esteemed is 
better than silver or gold.”); MAX WEBER, ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 186-88 (1998). 
111. Post, supra note 104, at 700 (claiming that an individual, in return for his social 
status, personally receives from others the “regard and estimation that society accords to that 
role”). 
112. PETER L. BERGER, THE HOMELESS MIND: MODERNIZATION AND CONSCIOUSNESS 
90 (1973). 
113 . Post, supra note 104, at 702 (describing a conception of defamation law as 
concerned primarily with the preservation of social status). 
114. Compare ICCPR, supra note 7, at art. 17 (“unlawful attacks on his honour and 
reputation”) with KRF, supra note 11, at art. 23 (“protection of honor and good name”) and 
GKRF, infra note 119, at art. 150(1) (“personal dignity” and “honor and good name”). 
115 . Compare KRF, supra note 11, at art. 23 (“1. Everyone has the right to the 
inviolability of private life, personal and family secrets, and the protection of his honor and 
good name. 2. Everyone has the right to privacy of his correspondence, telephone 
conversations, mail, telegraph, and other messages. Limitations to this right are permitted only 
by court order.”) with ICCPR, supra note 7, at art. 17 (“1. No one shall be subjected to 
arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to 
unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation. 2. Everyone has the right to the protection of 
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Constitution’s protections against attacks on an individual’s 
reputation when compared with the relevant ICCPR provision.116 In 
this connection, the Russian Constitution asserts stronger protections 
to reputation than even the ECHR.117 The Russian Criminal Code (the 
“Criminal Code”) includes a fairly detailed provision on defamation, 
with increased liability where the target of slanderous accusations is 
alleged to have committed a serious crime, a salient point for Mr. 
Nemtsov’s case, as explained later.118 The Russian Civil Code (the 
“Civil Code”), meanwhile, protects reputation in two subdivisions.119 
                                                                                                             
the law against such interference or attacks.”) and ECHR, supra note 7, at art. 8 (“1. Everyone 
has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 2. 
There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such 
as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of 
national security, public safety or the economic wellbeing of the country, for the prevention of 
disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others.”). 
116 . Compare KRF, supra note 11, at art. 23 (“1. Everyone has the right to the 
inviolability of private life, personal and family secrets, and the protection of his honor and 
good name. 2. Everyone has the right to privacy of his correspondence, telephone 
conversations, mail, telegraph, and other messages. Limitations to this right are permitted only 
by court order.”) with ICCPR, supra note 7, at art. 17 (“1. No one shall be subjected to 
arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to 
unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation. 2. Everyone has the right to the protection of 
the law against such interference or attacks.”) 
117 . Compare KRF, supra note 11, at art. 23 (“1. Everyone has the right to the 
inviolability of private life, personal and family secrets, and the protection of his honor and 
good name. 2. Everyone has the right to privacy of his correspondence, telephone 
conversations, mail, telegraph, and other messages. Limitations to this right are permitted only 
by court order.”) with ECHR, supra note 7, at art. 8 (“1. Everyone has the right to respect for 
his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference 
by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the 
law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety 
or the economic wellbeing of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the 
protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”). 
118 . Федеральный закон N 63-ФЗ, Уголовный кодекс Российской Федерации 
[Federal Law No. 63-FZ, The Criminal Code of the Russian Federation] (as amended July 6, 
2016) (Russ.) [hereinafter UKRF] art. 128.1 (“Defamation connected with an accusation of the 
commission of a serious or especially serious crime is punishable by a fine of up to five 
million rubles, or the salary or other income of a period of up to three years, or by compulsory 
labor for a term of up to four hundred and eighty hours.”). 
119 . Федеральный закон N 51-ФЗ, Гражданский кодекс Российской Федерации 
[Federal Law No. 51-FZ, The Civil Code of the Russian Federation] (as amended July 3, 2016) 
(Russ.) [hereinafter GKRF] art. 150.1 (“Life and health, personal dignity, personal integrity, 
honor and good name, goodwill" and "other intangible goods belonging to a citizen from birth, 
or by law, are inalienable and non-transferable in any other way.”); id. at art. 150.2 (“In cases 
and in a manner prescribed by law, intangible goods belonging to the deceased, may be 
protected by other persons.”); id. at art. 152.1 (“A citizen is within his rights to demand the 
 
2016] THE CASE FOR BORIS NEMTSOV 1311 
In one, the Civil Code protects Russian nationals’ “dignity” and 
“honor,” and gives them the right to the refutation of defamatory 
allegations in the medium used to disseminate the claims in the first 
place.120 In the other, it protects the individual’s “intangible goods,” 
which include honor and good name.121 
When it comes to use of mass media to defamatory ends, the 
Russian Supreme Court’s conceptual definition of false information 
— or, as directly translated from the Russian legal literature, 
“information not corresponding to reality” — is clear generally, but 
prohibitively difficult to render in English.122  The Supreme Court 
holds, essentially, that statements alleging facts and events that did 
not happen “in reality,” during the time period in which they are 
alleged to have happened, qualify as false.123 Of course, the false 
allegations must have some negative effect on the dignity, honor, or 
business reputation of the target in order to be actionable.124 
a. Honor: Definitions and Implementation in the Russian Constitution 
The current Russian Constitution, effective as of 1993, is the 
jurisdiction’s supreme law.125 It is split into two sections, the first 
made up of nine chapters and the second made up of one.126 The 
provisions of the first chapter discuss the basis of the federal 
                                                                                                             
refutation of a discredit to his honor, dignity or business reputation, if such disseminated 
statements are not proven true. Rebuttal should be done by the same means used to circulate 
information about the citizen, or other similar means.”). 
120. Id. at art. 152. 
121. Id. at art. 150. 
122. See the Facebook discussion between the author and, among others, the director of 
Human Rights Watch Russia and one of Russia's most prominent litigators at international 
human rights tribunals, regarding how to translate the provision to English, with the latter 
stating that any attempt to do so would be “impossible.” Thomas Callahan, FACEBOOK (Nov. 
6, 2015), https://www.facebook.com/RovingBlade/posts/10101219752672770. The original 
Russian is, “Не соответствующими действительности сведениями являются утверждения 
о фактах или событиях, которые не имели места в реальности во время, к которому 
относятся оспариваемые сведения.” (Quoting the Plenary Directive, supra note 3.) 
123. Plenary Directive, supra note 3, at 4 (stating that “[u]ntrue information constitutes 
statements of facts or events that did not occur in reality” at the time they are alleged to have 
occurred). 
124. GKRF, supra note 119, at art. 152. 
125. KRF, supra note 11, at art. 15 (“1. The Constitution of the Russian Federation shall 
have supreme juridical force, direct action and shall be used on the whole territory of the 
Russian Federation. Laws and other legal acts adopted in the Russian Federation shall not 
contradict the Constitution of the Russian Federation.”). 
126. See generally id. 
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constitutional system, including the hierarchy of jurisdictions within 
and across regions; the separation of the executive from the 
legislature and judiciary; and the establishment of a secular 
government. 127  The second chapter is entitled Human and Civil 
Rights and Freedoms, and in addition to protections to reputation it 
also includes the right to privacy, the freedom of expression, 
protections on minority languages and cultures, a ban on torture, and 
other human rights provisions.128 The third chapter explains Russia’s 
federal structure – the methods of legislation, the role of the Central 
Bank, the status of the autonomous regions, and so on.129 Subsequent 
chapters lay out various administrative features of the Russian 
government, the rights and duties of the Russian Federation as a 
sovereign jurisdiction, as well as various other questions of 
governance.130 
Article 23 of the Russian Constitution, the sixth of forty-seven 
articles in the Human and Civil Rights and Freedoms chapter, protects 
the right to privacy. 131  Article 23.1, the section relevant to the 
discussion here, states, in full: “Everyone shall have the right to the 
inviolability of his private life, personal and family privacy, and 
protection of his honor and reputation.” 132  The Russian Plenary 
Supreme Court’s 2005 directive on practical application of civil 
defamation law (the “Plenary Directive”), discussed in greater detail 
later on, refers first and foremost to Article 23 of the Constitution.133 
                                                                                                             
127 . See id. at arts. 1-16 (“Chapter 1. The Fundamentals of the Constitutional 
System[.]”). 
128. See id. at arts. 17-64 (“Chapter 2. Rights and Freedoms of Man and Citizen[.]”). 
129. See id. at arts. 65-79 (“Chapter 3. The Federal Structure[.]”). 
130. See id. at arts. 80-137 (“Chapter 4. The President of the Russian Federation (Art. 
80-93); Chapter 5. The Federal Assembly (Art. 94-109); Chapter 6. The Government of the 
Russian Federation (Art. 110-117); Chapter 7. Judicial Power (Art. 118-129); Chapter 8. Local 
Self-government (Art. 130-133); Chapter 9. Constitutional Amendments and Review of the 
Constitution (Art. 134-137)”). 
131. KRF, supra note 11, at art. 23 (“1. Everyone has the right to the inviolability of 
private life, personal and family secrets, and the protection of his honor and good name. 2. 
Everyone has the right to privacy of his correspondence, telephone conversations, mail, 
telegraph, and other messages. Limitations to this right are permitted only by court order.”). 
132. Id. The final clause of the provision literally protects “доброе имя” (dobroe imya), 
which translates directly to “good name” but, as in English, indirectly to “reputation.” The 
other provision of Article 23 protects privacy of correspondence subject to limitation by a 
court order. 
133. Plenary Directive, supra note 3, ¶ 1 (opening the Plenary Directive with, “Pursuant 
to Article 23 of the Russian Constitution”). 
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Russia also has various Constitutional Laws, with one of 
particular concern for the purposes of this Note: the Federal 
Constitutional Law on the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation 
(the “Law on the Supreme Court”).134 Article 5 of this statute outlines 
the makeup and authority of the Plenary Supreme Court of the 
Russian Federation (the “Plenary Supreme Court”), on whose 
directive on civil defamation this Note relies in multiple instances.135 
The Plenary Supreme Court, inter alia, issues decrees on judicial 
application of statutory law.136  It is made up of the heads of the 
judicial boards of the Supreme Court — the Chairman, First Deputy 
Chairman, and Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Court of the Russian 
Federation. 137  Others who may participate in plenary proceedings 
include, but are not limited to, the Prosecutor General, the Minister of 
Justice, the President of the Constitutional Court, and additional 
judges of the Constitutional Court or other Russian courts.138 The 
Plenary Supreme Court has the authority to appoint various judicial 
offices across jurisdictions within Russia, as well as to review 
executive petitions to initiate criminal proceedings. 139  The most 
                                                                                                             
134 . Федеральный конституционный закон от 05.02.2014 N 3-FKZ (ред. от 
04.11.2014) “О Верховном Суде Российской Федерации” (Federal Constitutional Law of 
02/05/2014 No. 3-FKZ (as amended 11/04/2014) “On the Supreme Court of the Russian 
Federation”) [hereinafter Law on the Supreme Court] (Russ.). 
135. Id. at art. 5. 
136. See, e.g., Plenary Directive, supra note 3. 
137. Law on the Supreme Court, supra note 134, at art. 5.1 (“The Plenum of the 
Supreme Court of the Russian Federation shall consist of the Chairman of the Supreme Court 
of the Russian Federation, the First Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Court of the Russian 
Federation, the Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation — the 
chairmen of the judicial boards of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, referred to in 
paragraph 2 of Article 3 of the Federal Constitutional Law … and judges of the Supreme Court 
of the Russian Federation.”). 
138. Id. at art 5.3.2 (“The Plenum of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation 
addresses issues related to implementation, in accordance with Article 104 of the Constitution 
of the Russian Federation granted to the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, of the 
legality of legislative initiatives on issues within its jurisdiction.”). 
139. Id. at art. 5.3.4 (“The Plenum of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation 
selects, by referral from the Chairman of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, a 
Secretary of the Plenum of the Supreme Court from the judges of the Supreme Court of the 
Russian Federation for a period of three years. The same judge may be elected Secretary of the 
Supreme Court of the Russian Federation multiple times.”); id. at art. 5.3.5 (“[A]pproves the 
composition of the Judicial Board on Administrative Cases of the Supreme Court of the 
Russian Federation, the Judicial Board on Civil Cases of the Supreme Court, the Judicial 
Collegium for Criminal Cases of the Supreme Court, the Judicial Board on Economic Disputes 
of the Supreme Court, the Judicial Board for military personnel of the Supreme Court 
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pertinent subdivision of Article 5 of the Law on the Supreme Court 
for this Note, though, is Article 5.3.1-2, which authorizes the Plenary 
Supreme Court to “provide the courts with explanations on judicial 
practice in order to ensure uniform application of the legislation of the 
Russian Federation,” and to “resolve issues related to 
implementation” of the law.140 The decree On Court Practice in Cases 
of Protection of the Honor and Dignity of Citizens, as well as 
Goodwill of Citizens and Legal Persons, issued in 2005, does exactly 
this.141 
b. Defamation: Attacks on Reputation in the Russian Criminal Code 
Russian federal law is generally reported thematically in 
collected codes, for example the Criminal Code, the Labor Code, the 
Administrative Code, et cetera. They are all updated often to 
accommodate new legal concepts or to expand or narrow existing 
provisions. 142  The primary current provision of Russian federal 
criminal law treating defamation, Article 128.1 of the Criminal Code, 
                                                                                                             
Federation (hereinafter the Judicial Board of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation), 
and the transfer of judges from one judicial board of the Supreme Court of the Russian 
Federation to another judicial board of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation.”); id. at 
art. 5.3.9 (“[A]pproves, by referral of the Chairman of the appropriate court, the personal 
composition of the Supreme Court of the republic, territorial, regional court, federal court, 
court of an autonomous region, court of an autonomous district, military court, tribunal, 
District Appellate Court, Arbitration Court of the Russian Federation, or court of intellectual 
property rights.”); id. at art. 5.3.8 (“[A]pproves, in connection with referrals from the President 
of the Russian Federation, the composition of the judicial collegium of judges of the Supreme 
Court of the Russian Federation, adopted in accordance with the Criminal Procedural Code of 
the Russian Federation concluded in the actions of the Prosecutor General of the Russian 
Federation and (or) the Chairman of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation, 
the elements of a crime for a decision to initiate criminal proceedings against given 
individuals, or to make a decision about bringing them as defendants in a criminal case, if the 
criminal case was instituted against others.”). 
140. Id. at art. 5.3.1-2 (“The Plenum of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation 1) 
examines the materials of analysis and summary of judicial practice and gives courts 
explanations on judicial practice in order to ensure uniform application of the legislation of the 
Russian Federation; 2) resolves issues related to implementation, in accordance with Article 
104 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, granting the Supreme Court of the Russian 
Federation the right of legislative initiative on issues within its jurisdiction.”). 
141. Plenary Directive, supra note 3. 
142. See, for example, ConsultantPlus entry for UKRF, supra note 118, at ch. 17, which 
includes defamation, showing amendments in 1999, 2003, 2004, 2008, 2009, 2011, 2012, and 
2013, http://www.consultant.ru/popular/ukrf/10_25.html#p1791.  
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came into force in June 2012.143 A brief article consisting of five 
sections that vary liability by circumstance, it defines defamation as 
“the spread of false information discrediting the honor and dignity of 
another person or undermining his reputation.”144  The language is 
analogous to that of the Russian Civil Code's reputation provision, 
discussed below. Importantly for Mr. Nemtsov’s case, Article 128.1 
does not address, and therefore does not bar, posthumous defamation 
claims.145 The Supreme Court has confirmed this understanding of the 
law, stating expressly that there is no statute of limitations on such 
claims.146 
Russia’s criminal laws often feature varying levels of liability 
depending on the context of the offense. Under Article 128.1.2, 
defamation carries liability of up to RUB1,000,000, one year’s salary 
or other income, or forced labor of up to 240 hours when carried out 
by use of the media or other public means of expression.147 Article 
128.1.5 increases criminal penalties to RUB5,000,000, three years’ 
salary or defamer’s other income, or up to 480 hours of forced labor if 
the defamation contains accusations that the target committed an 
“especially serious crime.”148 What constitutes such a crime is not 
defined in the law.149 The likely especially serious crime of treason, 
though, which is the subject of Article 275 of the Criminal Code, 
includes “other assistance” to “a foreign state, an international or 
                                                                                                             
143 . Путин подписал закон "О клевете" (Putin Signs Law “On Defamation”), 
INTERFAX (July 30, 2012, 2:20 PM), http://www.interfax.ru/russia/258078 (reporting on new 
defamation law of July 2012); UKRF, supra note 118, at art. 128.1 (Defamation), 
CONSULTANTPLUS 
http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_10699/8a73d26dba7976d6c43cc94aa151
5368fef256f0/ (showing entry into force of July 28, 2012). 
144. The English words “defamation,” “slander,” and “libel” all translate to “клевета” 
(kleveta) in Russian. Kleveta is the title of Article 128.1. In order to avoid confusion given the 
nuances between these English words, I have chosen to use the more general “defamation” for 
the purposes of this Note. 
145. UKRF, supra note 118, at art. 128 (not stating exhaustion of a cause of action 
concurrent with the death of the target of defamation). 
146. Plenary Directive, supra note 3 (allowing representatives of a target of defamation 
to bring a case after his death). 
147. UKRF, supra note 118, at art. 128.1.2. In August 2016, RUB1,000,000 equaled US 
$15,080. 
148 . Id. at art. 128.1.5 (“Defamation in combination with an accusation of the 
commission of a serious or especially serious crime is punishable by a fine of up to five 
million rubles or the salary or other income of a period of up to three years, or by compulsory 
labor for a term of up to four-hundred and eighty hours.”) 
149. Id. 
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foreign organization or its representatives in activities directed against 
the security of the Russian Federation.” 150  The Russian media in 
question accused Mr. Nemtsov of at least participating in a conspiracy 
to stoke unrest in Russia at the bidding of non-Russian interests, 
actions that would tend to fit this description.151 Treason is the first 
provision in the section of the Criminal Code entitled Crimes Against 
the Foundations of Constitutional Order and State Security, and is 
punishable by a mandatory minimum twelve-year prison term.152 
The Russian Criminal Procedural Code sets out three different 
kinds of criminal prosecutions: public, private-public, and private.153 
Given the individual injury following defamation, Article 128 
proceedings fall under the final category, which means that private 
individuals have the right to petition for criminal charges against 
other individuals they allege to have engaged in criminal defamation 
against them.154 Litigants in a Russian criminal defamation action also 
have the option to resolve the complaint in “reconciliation.”155 The 
relevant procedural statute even designates a room to be used for this 
purpose.156 
In its 2013 report to the Committee on its ICCPR compliance, 
Russia notes several articles of the Criminal Code that, it asserts, are 
                                                                                                             
150. Id. at art. 275. “High treason” includes “providing financial, material, technical, 
advisory or other assistance to a foreign state, an international or foreign organization or their 
representatives in activities directed against the security of the Russian Federation” and is 
punishable by a minimum 12 and maximum 20 years in prison, plus a fine of up to 
RUB500,000 or the equivalent of three years' salary or other income. Id. 
151. Nechepurenko, supra note 5 (providing a general idea of the claims levied against 
Mr. Nemtsov in Russian media).  
152. UKRF, supra note 118, at art. 275 (“High Treason”). 
153. Федеральный Закон N 174-ФЗ, Уголовно-процессуальный кодекс Российской 
Федерации [Federal Law No. 174-FZ, Criminal Procedural Code of the Russian Federation] 
(as amended July 6, 2016) (Russ.) [hereinafter UPKRF] art.  20.1 (“Depending on the nature 
and severity of the crime, a prosecution, including prosecution in court, shall be carried out as 
public, private-public, and private.”). 
154. Id. at art. 20.2 (“Criminal cases involving crimes under Articles 115 part one, 116 
part one, and 128.1 part one of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation are considered 
criminal cases of private prosecution, initiated only at the application of the victim or his legal 
representative … subject to termination in connection with the reconciliation of the victim and 
the accused. Reconciliation is allowed before the court in the deliberation room of the court.”). 
155. Id. 
156. Id. 
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analogous to Article 17 of the Covenant.157 The report refers first to 
Articles 138, 138.1, and 139 of the Criminal Code: the provisions on 
violation of privacy of correspondence (by various electronic and 
other means), the illegal sale of surveillance technology that could be 
used for such violations, and violation of the inviolability of the 
home, respectively. 158  Oddly, these provisions are contained in 
Chapter 19 of the Criminal Code, which treats Crimes Against the 
Constitutional Rights and Freedoms of the Person and Citizen.159 
However, civil law sections are addressed in a subsequent paragraph 
of the report (which is discussed in greater detail below).160 
The Criminal Code is not the only body of Russian federal 
statutory law protecting the right to reputation. To that effect, the 
following discussion explores protections to “dignity, honor, and 
business reputation” as well as “intangible goods” including dignity 
and honor in the Civil Code. The Supreme Court’s position regarding 
the separate sources of liability is that neither the failure to bring a 
criminal proceeding under Article 128, the closure of such a criminal 
action, nor a verdict in any direction will bar a Russian claimant from 
filing a civil defamation complaint on the same cause of action.161 
c. Dignity: Intangible Goods and the Right to Rebuttal in the Russian 
Civil Code 
The Russian Civil Code addresses reputation in two separate 
provisions.162 The first, Civil Code Article 150, is entitled Intangible 
Goods.163 It is followed by Article 152, which is entitled Right to 
Protection of Honor, Dignity, and Goodwill.164 The latter provides 
                                                                                                             
157. U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties 
under Article 40 of the Covenant, Seventh Periodic Reports of States Parties: Russian 
Federation, U.N. Doc. CCPR/RUS/7 (Jan. 29, 2013) [hereinafter Russian Periodic Report]. 
158. Id. 
159. UKRF, supra note 118, at ch. 19 (“Crimes Against the Constitutional Rights and 
Freedoms of Person and Citizen[.]”). 
160. Russian Periodic Report, supra note 157, ¶ 104. 
161. Plenary Directive, supra note 3, ¶ 24 (“[R]efusal to initiate criminal proceedings 
under Article 129 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, the termination of a 
criminal case, as well as the imposition of a sentence does not exclude the possibility of 
bringing an action to protect the honor and dignity or business reputation in civil 
proceedings.”). 
162. GKRF, supra note 119, at arts. 150, 152. 
163. Id. at art. 150 (“Intangible Goods”). 
164. Id. at art. 152 (“Protection of Honor, Dignity, and Goodwill”). 
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significantly stronger civil protections.165 Where Russia’s Criminal 
Code provision creates liability only after defamation has been 
established, the Civil Code creates liability unless the alleged defamer 
proves the truth of the allegations.166 The Civil Code provisions both 
clarify the rights of Russian nationals against defamation, as well as 
the non-criminal obligations of those making claims that are alleged 
to be damaging to another’s reputation.167 
Article 150 mirrors provisions of both the UDHR and the 
ICCPR by protecting a given individual's honor or reputation.168 For 
example, it states as inalienable and otherwise nontransferable the 
following rights: life, health, personal dignity and integrity, honor and 
good name, goodwill, privacy, the home, personal and family secrets, 
freedom of movement, freedom to choose place of residence, and 
name.169 However, unlike the specific civil liabilities named in Article 
                                                                                                             
165. Compare id. at art. 150 (“1. Life and health, personal dignity, personal integrity, 
honor and good name, goodwill” and “other intangible goods belonging to a citizen from birth, 
or by law, are inalienable and non-transferable in any other way. 2. In cases and in a manner 
prescribed by law, intangible goods belonging to the deceased, may be protected by other 
persons.”) with id. at art. 152 (“1. A citizen shall have the right to demand, in court, the 
refutation of defamation to his honor, dignity or business reputation, if such statements are not 
proven to be true. Rebuttal should be done by the same means used to circulate the information 
about the citizen, or by other similar means. At the request of interested persons, the protection 
of honor, dignity and business reputation of a citizen is permitted after his death. 2. 
Information defaming the honor, dignity or business reputation of a citizen in popular media 
must be refuted in the same mass media. The citizen ... is entitled to ... publish his response in 
the same mass media.”; “9. A citizen who has been targeted with information defaming his 
honor, dignity or business reputation, along with the refutation of that information or the 
publication of his response, is entitled to claim damages and compensation for moral damages 
caused by the proliferation of the information.”). 
166. Id. at art. 152 (“The citizen is within his rights to demand, at court, the refutation of 
statements discrediting his honor, dignity, or business reputation if the disseminator of such 
statements does not prove that they are true.”). 
167. See generally id. at art. 150, 152. 
168. Compare id. at art. 150 (“Life and health, personal dignity, personal integrity, honor 
and good name, goodwill” and “other intangible goods belonging to a citizen from birth, or by 
law, are inalienable and non-transferable in any other way.”) with UDHR, supra note 96, at art. 
12 (“No one shall be subjected to ... to attacks upon his honour and reputation.”) and ICCPR, 
supra note 7, at art. 17 (“No one shall be subjected to ... unlawful attacks on his honour and 
reputation.”). 
169. GKRF, supra note 119, at art. 150.1 (“Life and health, personal dignity, personal 
integrity, honor and good name, goodwill, privacy, home, personal and family secrets, freedom 
of movement, freedom of choice of place of residence, name, authorship, and other intangible 
goods, which belong to a citizen from birth or by law, are inalienable and non-transferable in 
any other way.”). 
2016] THE CASE FOR BORIS NEMTSOV 1319 
152, Article 150 only provides for injunctions against continued 
violations.170 
According to a plain reading of Article 152, the burden of proof 
falls on the complainant in a Russian civil defamation action.171 “A 
citizen shall have the right to demand refutation” of claims 
discrediting his honor, dignity or business reputation if such 
disseminated statements are proven false, states Article 152.1.172 Once 
falsity is established, a rebuttal “should be done by the same means 
through which the information was circulated” about the 
complainant.173 This applies to mass media, as in Mr. Nemtsov’s case, 
with one additional protection measure for the target of defamation.174 
While the refutation of the slanderous allegations must be published 
or disseminated in the same mass media that was used to make them, 
the target of defamation is also given the right to publish his own 
response to the claims in that very medium.175 
In its 2013 report to the Committee on ICCPR compliance, 
Russia addresses civil reputation and honor violations in the context 
of the Plenary Directive.176 There, Russia asserts that cases addressing 
unauthorized dissemination of damaging but truthful information 
about an individual’s private life may lead a court to award money 
damages pursuant to Article 151 of the Civil Code.177 Meanwhile, an 
individual could claim both the refutation of the slanderous claims, 
but also could be entitled to money damages under Article 152 of the 
Civil Code.178 All of this, Russia asserts, is its legislative method of 
                                                                                                             
170. See id. at art. 150.2 (“Intangible goods are protected in accordance with this Code 
and other laws in the instances and in the manner provided, as well as in those cases and to the 
extent to which the use of methods of protecting civil rights (Article 12) follows from the 
nature of the impaired intangible goods or personal non-property rights and the nature of the 
consequences of this violation.”). 
171. Id. at art. 152.1 (“A citizen shall have the right to demand, in court, the refutation of 
defamation to his honor, dignity or business reputation, if such statements are not proven to be 
true.”). 
172. Id. 
173. Id. 
174. Id. 
175. Id. at art. 152.2 (“Information defaming the honor, dignity or business reputation of 
a citizen in popular media, must be refuted in the same mass media. The citizen ... is entitled to  
... publish his response in the same mass media.”). 
176. Russian Periodic Report, supra note 157, ¶ 104. 
177. Id. 
178. Id. 
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incorporating the protections of Article 17 of the ICCPR into its 
domestic law.179 
One of the most important procedural provisions in all of 
Russian law as it concerns Mr. Nemtsov’s case is as follows: actions 
in pursuance of the protection of dignity, honor, and business 
reputation are brought “at the demand of interested persons,” which is 
not limited to the target of the defamatory claims.180 This is because, 
under Article 152.2 of the Civil Code, the protection of a Russian 
citizen’s dignity and honor continues “after his death.”181 That is, 
unlike in some other jurisdictions, subject matter jurisdiction over 
civil defamation claims is not extinguished with the death of the 
target of defamation.182 The Supreme Court clarified this point in the 
Plenary Directive, stating, “for example, relatives and heirs” 
constitute “interested persons” in the context of Article 152.2. 183 
Article 150 mirrors this concept by declaring that “other persons” 
may pursue protection of intangible goods “belonging to the 
deceased.”184 
d. The Right to Information in the Mass Media Law 
Litigants on behalf of Mr. Nemtsov should be aware of one 
provision in Russia’s federal Law on Mass Media, in the case that the 
Russian Federation asserts it as an affirmative defense.185 Article 38 
of the Law on Mass Media, in particular, protects the Russian public’s 
right of access to information.186 While two latter subdivisions of the 
law address government transparency generally, the first subdivision 
gives Russian citizens the right to “promptly receive…reliable 
                                                                                                             
179. Id. ¶ 102. Note that even in this explanation to the Committee, Russia asserts 
observance of European Court norms in its application of its own domestic laws. 
180. GKRF, supra note 119, at art. 152.2 (“At the request of interested persons, the 
protection of honor, dignity and business reputation of a citizen is permitted after his death.”). 
181. Id. 
182. Id. 
183. Plenary Directive, supra note 3, ¶ 13 (“At the request of interested parties (for 
example relatives, heirs) the protection of a citizen's honor and dignity is permitted after his 
death (paragraph 1 of Art. 152 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation.”). 
184. GKRF, supra note 119, at art. 150.2 (“In cases and in a manner prescribed by law, 
intangible goods belonging to the deceased may be protected by other persons.”). 
185. Закон РФ от 27.12.1991 N 2124-1 (ред. от 15.07.2016) "О средствах массовой 
информации" [Law of the Russian Federation from 12/27/1991 No. 2124-1 (as amended July 
15, 2016) “On Mediums of Mass Information” (Russ.) [hereinafter Mass Media Law]. 
186. Id. at art. 38 (“The Right to Receive Information”). 
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information” from the media on the activities of not only government 
agencies but also “public officials,” a term that could in some senses 
be used to characterize Mr. Nemtsov at the time of the media 
campaign in question given his leadership role in a registered political 
party.187 
3. Right to Reputation in the International Human Rights Context 
The Supreme Court of the Russian Federation has held, 
including in the Plenary Directive, that “recognized” principles and 
norms of international law, including treaties to which the Russian 
Federation is party, constitute foundations of the Russian legal 
system.188 As it so happens, privacy, reputation, and honor are all 
variously protected in the regional and global human rights treaties, 
including those that Russia has ratified. 189  This section looks at 
defamation in the context of the UDHR, which has no legal effect but 
which was a prototype for many of the international agreements on 
human rights that set legal standards on issues ranging from 
reputation to sexual violence in conflict, for example; the ICCPR; and 
the ECHR. The objective is to illustrate generally the relevant 
international understanding of reputation by highlighting the 
similarities in language between the treaties. 
After a discussion of the UDHR primarily for historical-
contextual purposes, the section discusses human rights treaties 
covering reputation in descending order of relevance to the goal of the 
paper. That is, the ICCPR, which creates the preferable tribunal where 
Mr. Nemtsov’s family should file suit against the Russian Federation, 
comes first. The European Convention on Human Rights, which 
Russia has ratified, but which features less clear protections given the 
absence of an explicit reputation provision, comes next. 
                                                                                                             
187. Id. (“Citizens have the right to promptly receive, through mass media, reliable 
information about the activities of state agencies, local governments, organizations, public 
associations and their officials.”). 
188. Plenary Directive, supra note 3, at 1 (naming both the ICCPR and the ECHR as 
foundations of Russian law). 
189. See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
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a. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
Representatives from the Soviet Union participated in the two-
year drafting process eventually leading to the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, which the United Nations General Assembly 
adopted in 1948. 190  The UDHR is a thirty-provision outline of 
universal rights that has subsequently been elaborated through various 
United Nations treaties.191 But though its representatives participated 
in drafting the UDHR, the Soviet Union was one of eight States (six 
of them nominally socialist) to abstain from voting for its adoption at 
the General Assembly.192 All the same, the Russian Federation is now 
party to multiple legally binding treaties that more specifically and 
strictly protect rights outlined in the UDHR.193 
Article 12 of the UDHR reads, “No one shall be subjected to 
arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or 
correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. 
Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such 
interference or attacks.”194 Regardless of, or perhaps given, the sheer 
breadth of rights protected, the UDHR is “morally, but not legally 
binding” on States given its status as a declaration of the United 
Nations General Assembly.195 The rights it calls on States to protect 
                                                                                                             
190 . See generally MARY ANN GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEW: ELEANOR 
ROOSEVELT AND THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2002); UDHR, supra 
note 96. 
191. See generally UDHR, supra note 96. 
192. Peter Danchin, Drafting History, COLUM. U. CTR. FOR TEACHING AND LEARNING, 
http://ccnmtl.columbia.edu/projects/mmt/udhr/udhr_general/drafting_history_10.html (noting 
the Soviet Union's role in the drafting of the UDHR); Glen Johnson, Development of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, RAZVITIE LICHNOSTI, http://rl-online.ru/articles/4-
03/224.html (noting same). 
193. Russia has ratified the Genocide Convention, CERD, the ICESCR and ICCPR, the 
Apartheid Convention, CEDAW, the CAT, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the 
Convention on the Rights of People with Disabilities, the Slavery Convention, and the 
Trafficking Convention, among many others. Treaty Participation search, UNITED NATIONS 
TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/pages/TreatyParticipantSearch.aspx?tab=UN 
(select “Russian Federation” in “Participant” menu). 
194. Compare UDHR, supra note 96, at art. 12, with ICCPR, supra note 7, at art. 17. 
195 . BRUNO SIMMA AND PHILIP ALSTON, THE SOURCES OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: 
CUSTOM, JUS COGENS, AND GENERAL PRINCIPLES 82-108 (1992) (describing the UDHR as 
non-binding); Hilary Charlesworth, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), MAX 
PLANCK ENCYC. PUB. INT’L L. (Feb. 2008), http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/
law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e887?rskey=ZnPaBZ&result=1&prd=EPIL 
(noting the UDHR's non-binding authority). 
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are now protected more specifically in other legally binding treaties, 
though, for example the ICCPR, the Convention Against Torture and 
Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and 
others.196 
b. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its 
Individual Complaint Component 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights was 
passed at the UN General Assembly in December 1966.197 It creates 
obligations on States Parties to protect the various civil and political 
rights of individuals subject to the State Party’s jurisdiction.198 The 
ICCPR took legal effect in March 1976 pursuant to Article 49, which 
gives the treaty authority following ratification by thirty-five States.199 
An early party to the Covenant, the Soviet Union — the Russian 
Federation’s legal predecessor — signed in 1968 and ratified in 
1973.200 Among other requirements, States Parties to the Covenant 
must report on their compliance whenever the Committee requests 
such a report, as in the Russian Federation’s report mentioned 
previously in this Note.201 
Article 28 of the ICCPR creates the United Nations Human 
Rights Committee. 202  Under Article 28, the Committee has the 
authority to clarify provisions of the Covenant by request, to conduct 
mandatory regular reviews of State Party compliance with the 
Covenant, and — more importantly to the purposes of this Note — 
                                                                                                             
196. UDHR, supra note 96, at art. 5 (“No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”). 
197. ICCPR, supra note 7 (“[E]ntry into force 23 March 1976[.]”). 
198. Id. at pmbl. 
199. Id. at art. 49 (“The present Covenant shall enter into force three months after the 
date of the deposit with the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the thirty-fifth 
instrument of ratification or instrument of accession.”); infra note 208. 
200. Status as of Jan. 14, 2016 (International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights), 
UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION,  https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=
TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-4&chapter=4&lang=en [hereinafter ICCPR Status] (showing the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics' ratification in 1973). 
201. ICCPR, supra note 7, at art. 40(1)(b) (“The States Parties to the present Covenant 
undertake to submit reports on the measures they have adopted which give effect to the rights 
recognized herein and on the progress made in the enjoyment of those rights … whenever the 
Committee so requests” after the first year of authority.). 
202. Id. at art. 28(1) (“There shall be established a Human Rights Committee (hereafter 
referred to in the present Covenant as the Committee).”). 
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take contentious jurisdiction over individuals’ claims that a State 
Party has violated human rights protected under the Covenant.203 The 
First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR allows the Committee to review 
Communications, as complaints under its jurisdiction are called, 
regarding State violations as long as an individual files the 
Communication.204 That is, neither other States nor non-governmental 
organizations (“NGOs”) may litigate allegations of human rights 
violations against a State at the Committee.205 
Decisions at the Committee, which are called Committee Views 
and may take years to be reached, are legally binding.206 Jurisdiction 
over complaints is contingent on ratification of the First Optional 
Protocol, which Russia has ratified and which is discussed in greater 
detail in a later section of this Note.207 The Committee has reviewed a 
very small number of Article 17 (right to privacy) complaints against 
the Russian Federation, but has never found one concerning 
reputation to be admissible.208 
Like most of the major multiple-issue human rights treaties, the 
ICCPR protects the right to reputation; Committee Views on the 
matter tend to refer to “honor and reputation” together.209 In fact, the 
ICCPR’s dual-provision Article 17 not only protects the right to 
reputation, but requires States Parties also to give legal protection to 
                                                                                                             
203. Id. 
204. First Optional Protocol, supra note 6, at art. 1 (“A State Party to the Covenant that 
becomes a Party to the present Protocol recognizes the competence of the Committee to 
receive and consider communications from individuals subject to its jurisdiction who claim to 
be victims of a violation by that State Party of any of the rights set forth in the Covenant. No 
communication shall be received by the Committee if it concerns a State Party to the Covenant 
which is not a Party to the present Protocol.”). 
205. Id. 
206. J. TH. MOLLER & A. DA ZAYAS, UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE 
CASE LAW, 1977-2008: A HANDBOOK 48 (2009) (“[T]he views constitute international case 
law and, as such, may be considered as part of what is known as ‘hard law.’”). 
207. Status as of Mar. 15, 2016 (Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights), UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/
Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-5&chapter=4&lang=en [hereinafter 
Optional Protocol Status] (showing the Russian Federation’s accession to the Optional 
Protocol on Oct. 1, 1991). 
208. For example, since the 114th Session (March 2012), the Committee has found two 
Article 17 communications against the Russian Federation to be admissible. Human Rights 
Committee Jurisprudence, OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM'R FOR HUM. RTS., 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CCPR/Pages/Jurisprudence.aspx. 
209. See e.g., Gilbert Martinez and Others v. Algeria, CCPR/C/109/D/1922/2009 ¶ 3.1 
(Dec. 2, 2013) (discussing “honor and reputation”). 
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targets of defamation.210 Also, it is worth mentioning in relation to 
Mr. Nemtsov’s case, the Committee holds that States Parties have a 
positive obligation to protect individuals against violations of rights 
protected by the ICCPR not only when committed by State agents (for 
example state-run media), but by other individuals or private entities 
(for example, so-called independent media).211 
As in some other treaties, the ICCPR treats reputation within the 
article on privacy. The first subdivision of Article 17 includes two 
distinct protections in a single sentence: “arbitrary and unlawful 
interference” with privacy, home, family, and correspondence is 
barred alongside “unlawful attacks” on honor and reputation.212 The 
second subdivision creates an important additional obligation on 
ratifying States: “Everyone,” it reads, has the right to “protection of 
the law against such interference or attacks.”213 The Soviet Union did 
not address Article 17 in its handful of reservations to the ICCPR; the 
Russian Federation has subsequently made no declaration or 
understanding regarding the provision.214 
The Committee has made clear in a General Comment on Article 
17 that States Parties to the ICCPR have an obligation to protect 
individuals from attacks on their reputation regardless of whether 
such attacks “emanate” from the State or from “natural or legal 
persons.”215 Further, the Committee notes that the inclusion of bans 
                                                                                                             
210. ICCPR, supra note 7, at art. 17 (“1. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or 
unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful 
attacks on his honour and reputation. 2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law 
against such interference or attacks.”). 
211. U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., Gen. Comment No. 31, Nature of the General Legal 
Obligation on States Parties to the Covenant ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (Mar. 
29, 2004) [hereinafter General Comment 31] (“[T]he positive obligations on States Parties to 
ensure Covenant rights will only be fully discharged if individuals are protected by the State, 
not just against violations of Covenant rights by its agents, but also against acts committed by 
private persons or entities that would impair the enjoyment of Covenant rights in so far as they 
are amenable to application between private persons or entities.”). 
212. ICCPR, supra note 7, at art. 17(1) (“No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or 
unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful 
attacks on his honour and reputation.”). 
213. Id. 
214 . See supra note 200 (showing States Parties' reservations, declarations, and 
understandings to the ICCPR). 
215. U.N. Int'l Hum. Rights Instruments, Comp. of Gen. Comments and Gen. Recs. 
Adopted by the Hum. Rights Treaty Bodies Vol. 1, 191 ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (Vol. 
1) (May 27, 2008) [hereinafter General Comment 16] (“Article 17 provides for the right of 
every person to be protected against arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, 
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on both “unlawful” and “arbitrary” interference with privacy (or, 
more specifically, reputation) is intentional.216 That is, derogations on 
the right to privacy may be permitted where required or allowed by 
law — for example, in light of reasonable national security 
concerns. 217  In the case of Mr. Nemtsov, the example would be 
attacks on reputation by the press in light of concerns of a “fifth 
column” bent on destabilizing the country, where restrictions on such 
press would be barred by other sections of Russian law. However, the 
Committee also holds that some “arbitrary” interferences may be 
impermissible despite being otherwise lawful.218 States Parties must 
ensure that “interference provided for by law should be in accordance 
with the provisions, aims and objectives of the Covenant,” and no 
matter what, should be reasonable given the circumstances.219 
The Russian Federation had an obligation under Article 17 of the 
ICCPR to protect Mr. Nemtsov against the very public designation by 
state media and others as an “internal enemy” and “national traitor” at 
the head of a conspiracy to destabilize Russia.220 There can be no 
question that a State Party must not carry out attacks on an 
individual’s reputation — an important consideration to be sure, but 
not the central issue of this Note. The obligation to protect individuals 
once such attacks have already taken place — especially where the 
attacks are of such force as to culminate in that individual’s 
assassination — is very clearly implicated in the case of Mr. 
Nemtsov. Where there has been an attack on reputation, the 
Committee holds that those responsible must be held as such.221 
                                                                                                             
home or correspondence as well as against unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation. In 
the view of the Committee this right is required to be guaranteed against all such interferences 
and attacks whether they emanate from State authorities or from natural or legal persons. The 
obligations imposed by this article require the State to adopt legislative and other measures to 
give effect to the prohibition against such interferences and attacks as well as to the protection 
of this right.”). 
216. Id. 
217. Id. 
218. Id. 
219. Id. 
220. See Kramer, supra note 4; see also Nechepurenko, supra note 5; General Comment 
16, supra note 215 (explaining defamation liability at the Committee). 
221. General Comment 16, supra note 215, at 193 ¶ 11 (“Provision must also be made 
for everyone effectively to be able to protect himself against any unlawful attacks that do 
occur and to have an effective remedy against those responsible.”). 
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The First Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (“Protocol”) is the complaint and recourse 
mechanism for individuals facing State violations of rights protected 
under the Covenant.222 The General Assembly adopted the Protocol in 
December 1966; it took legal effect in March 1976. 223  Ratifying 
States to the Protocol accept the Committee’s authority “to receive 
and consider communications from individuals subject to its 
jurisdiction” who allege the State in question violated one or multiple 
provisions of the ICCPR.224 An individual filing a Communication is 
referred to as its “author.”225 Once such a Communication has been 
received and weighed, the Protocol requires States Parties to “submit 
to the Committee written explanations or statements clarifying the 
matter and the remedy, if any, that may have been taken” in response 
to the violation.226 Article 12 of the Protocol gives States Parties the 
explicit right to denounce the Committee’s jurisdiction.227 No State, 
however, has ratified the Protocol and subsequently denounced the 
Committee’s jurisdiction.228 
Russia acceded to the Protocol in the Soviet twilight, on October 
1, 1991.229 Moscow’s single declaration to the treaty establishes a 
domestic exhaustion requirement and a requirement that only matters 
not under consideration at other tribunals be considered at the 
                                                                                                             
222. First Optional Protocol, supra note 6. 
223. Id. 
224. Id. at art. 1 (“A State Party to the Covenant that becomes a Party to the present 
Protocol recognizes the competence of the Committee to receive and consider communications 
from individuals subject to its jurisdiction who claim to be victims of a violation by that State 
Party of any of the rights set forth in the Covenant. No communication shall be received by the 
Committee if it concerns a State Party to the Covenant which is not a Party to the present 
Protocol.”). 
225. See Hum. Rts. Comm. Communication No. 1450/2006, infra note 305, at 1.1; Hum. 
Rts. Comm. Communication No. 1619/2007, infra note 305, at 1.1; and Hum. Rts. Comm. 
Communication No. 1482/2006, infra note 305, at 1.1. 
226. First Optional Protocol, supra note 6, at art. 4.2 (“Within six months, the receiving 
State shall submit to the Committee written explanations or statements clarifying the matter 
and the remedy, if any, that may have been taken by that State.”). 
227. Id. at art. 12.1 (“Any State Party may denounce the present Protocol at any time by 
written notification addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Denunciation 
shall take effect three months after the date of receipt of the notification by the Secretary-
General.”). 
228 . Optional Protocol Status, supra note 207 (showing States Parties and no 
denunciations). 
229. Id. 
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Committee.230 These requirements are already contained in Articles 
5(2)(a) and 5(2)(b) of the Protocol.231 Hypothetically, the declaration 
may have been an attempt to bypass the second clause of Article 
5(2)(b), which waives the domestic exhaustion requirement “where 
the application of the remedies is unreasonably prolonged;” the Soviet 
justice system was notoriously slow. Russia became subject to the 
Protocol’s jurisdiction simultaneously with the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union in December 1991.232 
The Committee first determines whether a Communication is 
admissible. 233  Then, notwithstanding the domestic exhaustion and 
exclusivity requirements, it raises the allegation with the State 
Party.234 The State Party, in turn, has six months to submit in writing 
any explanation or “statements clarifying” what it has done to remedy 
the alleged violation.235 
                                                                                                             
230. Id. (“The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, pursuant to article 1 of the Optional 
Protocol, recognizes the competence of the Human Rights Committee to receive and consider 
communications from individuals subject to the jurisdiction of the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics, in respect of situations or events occurring after the date on which the Protocol 
entered into force for the USSR. The Soviet Union also proceeds from the understanding that 
the Committee shall not consider any communications unless it has been ascertained that the 
same matter is not being examined under another procedure of international investigation or 
settlement and that the individual in question has exhausted all available domestic remedies.”). 
231. First Optional Protocol, supra note 6, at art. 5 (“2. The Committee shall not consider 
any communication from an individual unless it has ascertained that: (a) The same matter is 
not being examined under another procedure of international investigation or settlement; (b) 
The individual has exhausted all available domestic remedies. This shall not be the rule where 
the application of the remedies is unreasonably prolonged.”). 
232 . Historical Information, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/HistoricalInfo.aspx (“By a communication dated 24 December 
1991, the President of the Russian Federation notified the Secretary-General that membership 
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in the United Nations is being continued by 
the Russian Federation. The Government of the Russian Federation subsequently informed the 
Secretary-General that as at 24 December 1991, the Russian Federation maintains full 
responsibility for all the rights and obligations of the USSR under the Charter of the United 
Nations and multilateral treaties deposited with the Secretary-General and requested that the 
name ‘Russian Federation’ be used in the United Nations in place of the name ‘Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics.’”). 
233. First Optional Protocol, supra note 6, at art. 4 (“Subject to the provisions of article 
3, the Committee shall bring any communications submitted to it under the present Protocol to 
the attention of the State Party to the present Protocol alleged to be violating any provision of 
the Covenant.”). 
234. Id. 
235. Id. 
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Neither organizations nor groups of individuals may submit 
Communications to the Committee, though both prospects were 
discussed in the drafting stage of the Protocol.236 Further, anonymous 
submissions are barred.237 And though the preferred complainant is 
the individual whose rights were allegedly violated, the Committee 
accepts Communications from close relatives or other close associates 
of the alleged victim.238 Further, legal and human rights organizations 
commonly file supporting briefs with the Committee in conjunction 
with individual Communications.239 Pursuant to Article 5(1) of the 
Protocol, the Committee will consider “all written information made 
available to it” by the filing individual or the State Party 
                                                                                                             
236. See U.N. Secretary-General, Annotations to the Draft International Covenant on 
Human Rights, 10 U.N. GAOR Annex at 81, U.N. Doc. A/2929 (1955) (“Opinion was deeply 
divided concerning the right to initiate proceedings before the committee. Some held that only 
States should be allowed to appeal to the committee. Others proposed various ways of 
enlarging the right to initiate proceedings. In resolution 421 (V), section F, the General 
Assembly requested the Commission on Human Rights to consider provisions ‘to be inserted 
in the draft covenant or in separate protocols, for the receipt and examination of petitions from 
individuals and organizations with respect to alleged violations of the covenant’. Again, by 
resolution 737 B(VIII), the Assembly transmitted to the Commission a proposal requesting it 
to draft ‘provisions recognizing the right of petition of every natural person, every duly 
constituted group of individuals and every recognized non-governmental organization’, for 
inclusion in the covenant in accordance with the decision of the General Assembly in its 
resolution 421 (V), section F, mentioned above. All the proposals, which would extend the 
right to initiate proceedings, were either rejected or withdrawn.”); Report of the Ninth Session 
of the Hum. Rts. Comm., 16 U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. 8), 16-17, U.N. Doc. E/2447 (1953) 
(“[C]ertain non-governmental organizations could bring to the notice of the United Nations 
matters falling within the purview of the Economic and Social Council and this recognition 
should be taken into account in considering the admissibility of communications from non-
governmental organizations. To limit the right of complaint … would hamper the work which 
those organizations were doing, and would make the United Nations appear isolated in the 
eyes of many ordinary people. They strongly supported the proposals which empowered the 
Committee to act on its own motion and to receive communications from non-governmental 
organizations and individuals.”). 
237. First Optional Protocol, supra note 6, at art. 3 (“The Committee shall consider 
inadmissible any communication under the present Protocol which is anonymous, or which it 
considers to be an abuse of the right of submission of such communications or to be 
incompatible with the provisions of the Covenant.”). 
238. Pestaño, infra note 305. The parents of the alleged victim of rights violations by the 
Philippines authored the Communication. 
239 . Ida Lintel & Cedric Ryngaert, The Interface between Non-Governmental 
Organisations and the Human Rights Committee, 15 INT'L COMMUNITY L. REV. 359, 361 
(2013) (discussing generally the individual-focused nature of the ICCPR, with the common 
practice of support in litigation by civil society organizations). 
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respondent.240 That is, either party may file supporting information 
prepared by third parties in hopes of persuading the Committee.241 
Prominent Russian civil rights litigators have asserted concerns 
that the Committee Views are of a “very uncertain legal status.”242 
Indeed, whether or not Committee Views constitute binding law is a 
point of contention in the international legal literature. At the same 
time the Committee asserts — and legal academics generally agree — 
that Committee Views are hard, binding law.243 
c. The European Convention on Human Rights 
The European Convention on Human Rights (formally the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, which is how the Supreme Court refers to it) is the Council 
of Europe’s interstate human rights mechanism.244 All members of the 
Council of Europe are States Parties to the Convention, and new 
Council members are expected to ratify at their earliest opportunity.245 
To be clear, the Convention is not a European Union (“EU”) 
instrument: while having jurisdiction over many EU Member States, 
it also binds non-EU Council of Europe members like Montenegro, 
Norway, Turkey, and, for that matter, Russia.246 Russia joined the 
Council of Europe in February 1996.247 
                                                                                                             
240. First Optional Protocol, supra note 6, at art. 5(1) (“The Committee shall consider 
communications received under the present Protocol in the light of all written information 
made available to it by the individual and by the State Party concerned.”). 
241. Id. 
242. See correspondence on file with the author. 
243. Moller & Da Zayas, supra note 206. 
244. ECHR, supra note 7 (“The Governments signatory hereto, being members of the 
Council of Europe [...], Considering that the aim of the Council of Europe is the achievement 
of greater unity between its members and that one of the methods by which that aim is to be 
pursued is the maintenance and further realisation of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms ..., Have agreed as follows[.]”). 
245. Conference Report Honouring of Commitments Entered into by Member States 
When Joining the Council of Europe, PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY OF THE COUNCIL OF 
EUROPE, art. 9 (Apr. 14, 1994), http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-
en.asp?fileid=16442&lang=en (“The Assembly recalls in this connection that accession to the 
Council of Europe must go together with becoming a party to the European Convention on 
Human Rights. It therefore considers that the ratification procedure should normally be 
completed within one year after accession to the Statute and signature of the Convention.”). 
246. Chart of signatures and ratifications of Treaty 005 (Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms), COUNCIL OF EUROPE (Jan. 25, 2016), 
http://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/search-on-treaties/-
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Russian nationals sue often on human rights questions at the 
European Court of Human Rights, the tribunal attached to the 
Convention.248 However, the Convention does not explicitly protect 
reputation.249 Article 8, the provision on the right to privacy, states 
only that, “[e]veryone has the right to respect for his private and 
family life, his home and his correspondence.”250 Governments are 
barred generally from interfering with the “exercise of this right” 
during normal conditions under the Convention. 251  However, the 
Convention allows derogation of the right to privacy and its auxiliary 
rights in response to various public safety or security concerns.252 The 
European Court sometimes reads protections against interference with 
honor or reputation into Article 8, as discussed in a later section. 
It is with these considerations in mind that representatives of Mr. 
Nemtsov should litigate a defamation case on his behalf. Given the 
very strong protections to reputation in Russian statutory law, they 
would have a strong case within the Russian court system. If 
exhausting the Russian court system fails to provide a favorable 
result, the ICCPR and ECHR also provide protections. The following 
Part outlines the very clear positions of Russia’s Supreme Court on 
the application of defamation law in both the criminal and civil 
contexts, while also looking at sample Committee and European 
Court decisions with a view to understanding the possible outcomes 
of a claim on Mr. Nemtsov’s behalf at those tribunals. 
                                                                                                             
/conventions/treaty/005/signatures?p_auth=ZlxTjJin (“Treaty open for signature by the 
member States of the Council of Europe and for accession by the European Union[.]”). 
247. Id. (showing Russian membership beginning in 1996). 
248. Decisions Concerning the Russian Federation, EUROPEAN CT. HUM. RTS. HUDOC, 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{"languageisocode":["ENG"],"respondent":["RUS"],"documentc
ollectionid2":["GRANDCHAMBER","CHAMBER"]} (showing six decisions against Russia 
in the first two weeks of 2016 alone). 
249. ECHR, supra note 7, at art. 8 (“Right to respect for private and family life: 1. 
Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this 
right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in 
the interests of national security, public safety or the economic wellbeing of the country, for 
the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection 
of the rights and freedoms of others.”). 
250. Id. 
251. Id. 
252. Id. 
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III. REPUTATION IN RUSSIAN COURTS AND AT THE 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNALS 
This Part explores the right to reputation at the Supreme Court of 
the Russian Federation and at the two relevant international human 
rights tribunals. This includes, first, deeper discussion of the Supreme 
Court’s Plenary Directive on jurisprudential application of the right to 
dignity, honor, and business reputation, to which the Note has 
referred in brief on multiple previous occasions. The Plenary 
Directive provides the baseline understanding of defamation law in 
the Russian court system.253 
Then, in order to illustrate in order of persuasive authority 
relative to the objective of the Note overall, this Part first looks at the 
totality of United Nations Human Rights Committee Views — three 
decisions — treating Article 17 claims against the Russian 
Federation; none was found admissible. It also examines the facts of 
three example successful Article 17 claims founded on reputation and 
honor at the Committee. It then looks at four example cases regarding 
defamation at the European Court, to which Russia is a party, and at 
which Russian nationals often litigate. Recall, though, that Article 8 
of the European Convention only vaguely protects individuals from 
“interference by a public authority” with “private and family life,” not 
reputation.254 For that reason, successful cases on point with that of 
Mr. Nemtsov are difficult to come by.255 
1. Defamation in the Russian Courts 
The Russian Plenary Supreme Court’s 2005 Resolution on 
Judicial Practice in Cases on the Protection of Honor and Dignity of 
Citizens and Goodwill of Citizens and Legal Entities (previously and 
hereafter referred to as the “Plenary Directive”) should be seen as the 
baseline understanding of defamation in Russian law.256 In Russia, 
                                                                                                             
253. Plenary Directive, supra note 3. 
254. ECHR, supra note 7, at art. 8 (“Right to respect for private and family life[.]”). 
255. Decisions Concerning Article 8, EUROPEAN CT. HUM. RTS. HUDOC, 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{"fulltext":["reputation"],"languageisocode":["ENG"],"article":["
8"],"documentcollectionid2":["GRANDCHAMBER","CHAMBER"]} (limiting search to 
include “reputation,” with results showing a total of 159 such cases against all ratifying parties, 
including inadmissibility judgments). 
256. See generally Plenary Directive, supra note 3; Todd Foglesong, The Dynamics of 
Judicial (In)dependence in Russia in Judicial Independence in THE AGE OF DEMOCRACY: 
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which is officially a civil law country but has been characterized as a 
hybrid civil-common law jurisdiction, one court’s decisions are not 
universally de jure binding on other courts. Lower courts do de facto 
tend to follow higher courts’ decisions, though. The Supreme Court is 
the country’s court of last resort in civil and criminal actions, and 
compliance with Plenary directives is expected.257 
The Plenary Directive begins by noting the right of all Russians 
to honor and good name found in Article 23 of the Constitution.258 It 
continues by noting that norms of international law, including 
international agreements to which Russia is a party, are among the 
foundations of the Russian legal system. 259  Among these 
considerations is also the fact that the freedom to impart and receive 
information is constitutionally protected in Russia; this question 
comes up again and again in the Plenary Directive.260 Meanwhile, it 
looks explicitly to the European Convention as a source of 
clarification on questions of dignity and honor.261 In fact, Russian 
courts’ application of defamation provisions “shall be construed in 
accordance with the legal position of the European Court of Human 
Rights.”262  This was also Russia’s stated position during its 2013 
ICCPR compliance review at the Committee.263 
One of the most relevant sections of the Plenary Directive for the 
purposes of this Note is the subdivision on the dissemination of 
untrue information.264 One initial procedural point in this section is 
that heirs and representatives of a deceased target of defamation may 
initiate proceedings under Article 152 of the Civil Code.265 Another is 
                                                                                                             
CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES FROM AROUND THE WORLD 65 (Peter H. Russell & David M. 
O’Brien eds., 2001) (explaining the place of Supreme Court plenary directives generally). 
257. KRF, supra note 11, at art. 126 (“The Supreme Court of the Russian Federation 
constitutes the highest federal organ on civil, criminal, administrative and other cases falling 
under the jurisdiction of the courts of general jurisdiction.”). 
258. Plenary Directive, supra note 3, ¶ 1 (opening the Plenary Directive with, “Pursuant 
to Article 23 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation”). 
259. Id. ¶ 2 (naming, specifically, the ICCPR and ECHR as “foundations” of Russian 
law). 
260 . Id. ¶ 2 (discussing the freedom of information); id. ¶ 9 (discussing statutory 
restrictions to information in Russia). 
261. Id. ¶ 3 (naming the ECHR as a persuasive source for defamation questions). 
262. Id. 
263. Russian Periodic Report, supra note 157, ¶ 102. 
264 . Plenary Directive, supra note 3, ¶ 13 (beginning of the section on untrue 
information). 
265. Id. 
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that anonymous defamatory allegations are not actionable, that is, the 
target of defamation must be able to identify a party levying the 
allegations.266 
Later sections identify various other procedural questions in 
defamation actions that directly concern the use of mass media for 
defamatory purposes, as in Mr. Nemtsov’s case.267 For example, a 
section on defendants in such actions states that both the authors of 
untrue defamatory statements as well as the “persons” who 
disseminated the statements may be held liable. 268  If the 
dissemination was through the media, the editors of the medium may 
also be held liable.269 If no author’s name is attached to the claim 
(television news media was central to the character assassination 
campaign against Mr. Nemtsov), the founder of the media company 
may be liable. 270  Meanwhile, respondent is to cover the costs of 
publishing refutations of defamatory allegations.271 There is no statute 
of limitations on such claims against the editorial boards of media 
shown to have engaged in defamation.272 
Criminal and civil damages are simultaneously available to a 
defamation claimant based on the same cause of action. 273 
Meanwhile, judgment in favor of a criminal defamation defendant 
does not preclude the plaintiff from pursuing civil damages on the 
same cause of action.274 In order for a civil claim to be actionable, at 
least one of two elements must be met: that the respondent distributed 
the defamatory information about the plaintiff, and that the 
                                                                                                             
266. Id. 
267. Id. ¶¶ 19-21 (discussing defamation in the media). 
268. Id. ¶ 19 (assigning liability for legal persons who make defamatory claims, as well 
as those who disseminate such claims). 
269. Id. ¶ 20 (assigning personal liability for editorial staff of media found to have 
disseminated defamatory claims). 
270 . Id. ¶ 21 (assigning personal liability for executives of media found to have 
disseminated defamatory claims). 
271. Id. ¶ 46 (assigning costs to respondent in a successful defamation action). Media is 
also addressed in various other sections not important for this Note, for example that the 
publishers or distributors of advertisements containing defamatory allegations are equally 
liable under Article 152. 
272. Id. ¶ 13 (extending liability to authors and editorial staff of media engaged in 
defamation). 
273. Id. ¶ 23 (allowing both civil and criminal liability for defamation on the same cause 
of action). 
274. Id. ¶ 24 (allowing for civil liability in tort following a failed criminal action on the 
same defamation cause of action). 
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defamatory allegations were untrue.275 If claimant is unable to prove 
either, the court should decline jurisdiction over the claim. 276  In 
addition to refutation of defamatory claims in a civil action, the 
claimant is also entitled to compensatory damages. 277  In the 
refutation, the respondent medium must identify which allegations 
about the claimant were false. 278  Factors for consideration in 
determining the amount of pecuniary damages include the nature and 
content of the publication, as well as the extent of dissemination.279 
Damages should be commensurate with the injury suffered, with a 
view to avoiding unreasonable burdens on the freedom of 
expression. 280  Meanwhile, due to a provision of the Russian 
Constitution barring forced expression, a court may not compel a 
defendant to apologize personally to a claimant.281 
The Plenary Directive defines defamation in multiple ways, none 
of which are mutually exclusive with the others. 282  One is that 
defamation requires false information, which in turn consists of 
assertions of purported fact that “did not occur in reality” at the time 
they are alleged to have occurred.283 One definition relevant to Mr. 
Nemtsov’s case is defamation as allegations that a “citizen has 
committed a dishonest act,” or has engaged in “unethical behavior in 
... political life.”284 The respondent in a civil defamation action must 
prove the truthfulness of the defamatory allegations, while the 
claimant must prove that the respondent, and not someone else, made 
the allegations.285 
                                                                                                             
275. Id. ¶ 30 (laying out the elements of a civil defamation cause of action). 
276. Id. ¶ 25. 
277. Id. ¶ 31 (assigning damages liability to defamation respondent in a successful case). 
278. Id. ¶ 37 (requiring media engaged in defamation to publicly identify and refute 
defamatory claims following an adverse action). 
279. Id. ¶ 33 (outlining the range of liabilities depending on severity of the claim). 
280. Id. 
281. Id. ¶ 40 (noting that even in a successful defamation action, respondent may not be 
compelled to apologize to claimant given Article 29's prohibition on forced expression). 
However, a court may oversee a settlement between the parties where it would not be contrary 
to public policy. 
282. Id. ¶¶ 28-29 (defining defamation). 
283 . Id. ¶ 28 (invoking the statutory definition of defamation noted on multiple 
occasions in this Note). 
284. Id. ¶ 29 (generally noting defamation liability for allegations that an individual 
engaged in dishonest or criminal conduct). 
285. Id. ¶ 33 (assigning burdens of proof on both claimant and respondent in a civil 
defamation action). 
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2. Privacy, Honor, and Reputation at the Human Rights Committee 
As this Note went to publication, the Committee had considered 
143 Communications against State Parties that in some way 
incorporate a claim on Article 17, the ICCPR provision protecting 
reputation.286 However, few of these Communications were both held 
admissible and resulted in Committee Views favorable to the 
complainant on the merits on the Article 17 cause of action. 287 
Further, not only has no Article 17 claim against the Russian 
Federation ever been found admissible, but only one Russian claimant 
has ever submitted a reputation- or honor-based Communication to 
the Committee.288 In order to anticipate the results of Mr. Nemtsov’s 
Article 17 case at the Committee, this Part examines all three Article 
17 claims against the Russian Federation along with three successful 
Article 17 claims against other States Party to the ICCPR and the First 
Optional Protocol. 
a. The Unsuccessful Article 17 Claims against the Russian Federation 
The Committee has accepted jurisdiction over Russian nationals’ 
cases including Article 17 claims on three occasions.289 However, it 
did not find Russia to be in violation of Article 17 in any of them.290 
Further, only one of the cases concerns reputation.291 
In Khakdar v. Russia, the author, Kesmatulla Khakdar, was born 
in Afghanistan, but having lived in Russia for two decades, he 
disputed his deportation to Afghanistan as an unlawful interference 
                                                                                                             
286 . Cases Concerning Article 17, U.N. HUM. RTS. OFF. HIGH COMMISSIONER, 
http://juris.ohchr.org/search/Documents (in “Body”, select “CCPR”; and in “Article”, select 
“CCPR-17,” “CCPR-17-1”, and “CCPR-17-2”) (last visited Apr. 13, 2016). 
287. Id. (in the drop-down menu “Type of Decision”, select “Adoption of Views” in 
order to filter out holdings on admissibility). 
288. Id. (in the drop-down menu “State or Entity”, select “Russian Federation”); id. (in 
the field “Keyword”, add “reputation”). 
289. Hum. Rts. Comm. Communication No. 2126/2011 (Kesmatulla Khakdar v. Russia), 
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/112/D/2126/2011 (Nov. 26, 2014); Hum. Rts. Comm. Communication No. 
1764/2008 (Zeydulla Vagab Ogly Alekperov v. Russia), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/109/D/1764/2008 
(Dec. 2, 2013); Hum. Rts. Comm. Communication No. 1983/2010 (Y.B. v. Russia), U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/110/D/1983/2010 (Apr. 23, 2014). 
290. Id. Hum. Rts. Comm. Communication No. 2126/2011, supra note 289; Hum. Rts. 
Comm. Communication No. 1764/2008, supra note 289; Hum. Rts. Comm. Communication 
No. 1983/2010, supra note 289. 
291. Hum. Rts. Comm. Communication No. 1983/2010, supra note 289. 
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with his private life in violation of Article 17 of the ICCPR.292 He was 
found to have failed to exhaust domestic remedies in relation to the 
claim, and so the Committee found it inadmissible. 293  Neither 
reputation nor honor featured in the Communication.294 
In Alekperov v. Russia, the author Zeydulla Vagab Ogly 
Alekperov was a prison inmate appealing multiple administrative 
details of his sentencing.295 His Article 17 claim was over an alleged 
interference with his ability to file a Communication, regarding the 
very case at hand, with the Committee.296 The Committee found that 
the author had not substantiated the claim, and found it 
inadmissible.297 Again, reputation did not factor into the Article 17 
claim.298 
In Y.B. v. Russia, the author was the defendant in a criminal 
case that lasted approximately two years.299 More than a year after the 
                                                                                                             
292. Hum. Rts. Comm. Communication No. 2126/2011, supra note 289, ¶ 3.3 (“The 
author further submits that, if he were returned to Afghanistan, his family life would be 
destroyed and annihilated, since his daughter and spouse would not be able to go with him, as 
the situation of general violence there amounts to a violation of article 7 of the Covenant. 
Moreover, they would be specifically targeted as non-Muslim women who do not speak the 
language and do not know the local customs, including religious customs. The author therefore 
submits that if he were deported to Afghanistan his rights under article 17 of the Covenant 
would be violated.”). 
293. Id. ¶ 10.4 (“The Committee notes the State party’s submission that the author had 
failed to exhaust the available domestic remedies in that he had failed to request a residence 
permit on the basis of his marriage to a Russian Federation citizen. The Committee notes that 
the author has not provided an explanation as to why applying for a residence permit on the 
ground of being married to a Russian Federation citizen and having a child, who is also a 
Russian Federation citizen, would not have constituted an effective remedy for the protection 
of his rights under article 17 of the Covenant. The Committee therefore declares the author’s 
claim under article 17 to be inadmissible under article 5, paragraph 2 (b), of the Optional 
Protocol.”). 
294. See generally id. 
295. Hum. Rts. Comm. Communication No. 1764/2008, supra note 289. 
296. Id. ¶ 2.11 (“The author’s sister requested the Committee: (1) not to discontinue his 
communication; (2) to inform the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation in Geneva 
about the interference with his correspondence with the Committee, and (3) to request the 
Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to provide explanations.”). 
297 . Id. ¶ 8.5 (“the Committee considers that this part of the communication is 
insufficiently substantiated for purposes of admissibility, and declares it inadmissible under 
article 2 of the Optional Protocol.”). 
298. See generally id. 
299. Hum. Rts. Comm. Communication No. 1983/2010, supra note 289, ¶¶ 2.1-2.2 (“2.1 
On 26 June 2006, the Prosecutor’s office in Velikie Luki, the town where the author resided, 
initiated criminal proceedings against him under article 319 of the Criminal Code (publicly 
offending a State agent). 2.2 On 27 May 2008, the justice of the peace of the 33rd district of 
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case was closed without going to trial, the local court’s website posted 
a press release stating that there was an ongoing criminal 
investigation against the author.300 Y.B. sued the town court, claiming 
damage to his reputation.301 The court stated a lack of jurisdiction, 
and the appellate level upheld that decision.302 In a related Article 17 
claim in the same Communication, Y.B.’s medical information was 
made known to a number of people involved with his investigation.303 
In all Y.B. claimed that Russia had violated seven different Articles 
of the ICCPR in handling his case, but the Committee found each 
claim to be unsubstantiated and, therefore, inadmissible.304 
b. Successful Honor and Reputation Claims against other States 
Parties 
The Committee has, in six cases, considered and ruled favorably 
on the merits regarding unlawful or arbitrary attacks on honor or 
                                                                                                             
Velikie Luki issued a decision to terminate the court case against the author based on the 
absence of corpus delicti of the crime.”). 
300. Id. ¶ 2.4 (“On 1 July 2009, an article was published on the website of the town court 
of Velikie Luki in the public information section, which included information to the effect that 
there was an ongoing criminal case against the author and that he was being investigated. The 
author was mentioned by name and information damaging to his reputation was accessible to 
all.”). 
301. Id. ¶ 2.5 (“[T]he author filed an application with the town court of Velikie Luki 
seeking compensation for the moral damages inflicted to him by the public being wrongly 
informed that he was under investigation for criminal activity.”). 
302. Id. ¶ 2.6 (“On 23 October 2009, the town court of Velikie Luki issued a ruling 
returning the author’s claim for lack of jurisdiction. The author then appealed this ruling to the 
Pskov regional court, which, on 1 December 2009, issued a cassation decision confirming that 
the Velikie Luki town court had no jurisdiction and ruling that the claim should be filed with 
the Moscow city court. The author attempted to apply for a supervisory review of that 
decision, but his request was denied by the Pskov regional court on 18 January 2010.”). 
303. Id. ¶ 6.4 (“The author further submitted that during the pretrial investigation in 
2006 a number of his medical records had been taken from medical establishments by 
investigating officers without a court order, in violation of his right to privacy under article 17, 
paragraph 1, of the Covenant. In that manner, confidential information regarding the state of 
the author’s health had become known to a large number of persons.”). 
304. Id. ¶ 9.5 (“The Committee observes that the author’s allegations of violations of his 
rights under [articles including 17] … are not substantiated in relation to the subject matter of 
his initial communication, namely that the refusal of the Velikie Luki town court to hear his 
case for moral damages caused by the publication of erroneous information on the court’s 
website, constituted a denial of justice. Therefore, the allegations in the above submissions are 
inadmissible under article 2 of the Optional Protocol. The finding above is without prejudice to 
the author’s ability to submit a separate communication with regard to any alleged violations 
of his rights under the Covenant that may have occurred.”). 
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reputation.305 Three of the Communications that resulted in favorable 
judgments for the claimants — that is, where the Committee found 
State violations of Article 17 of the ICCPR — are considered here. 
This subsection begins by examining a Communication with some 
similarities to the case of Mr. Nemtsov. In that case, the government 
of Turkmenistan asserted falsely on national television and in print 
that the author, an opposition-affiliated journalist with connections to 
the United States, had been involved in an assassination plot against 
the President of Turkmenistan; the Committee found that 
Turkmenistan had violated Article 17.306 
The subsection then continues with two additional Committee 
Views treating cases that very clearly featured unlawful or arbitrary 
interference with an individual’s honor or reputation. In one, the 
Philippines was found to have violated Article 17 after officially 
declaring that the murder of a potential whistleblower was a 
suicide.307 In the other, Germany was found to have violated Article 
17 after one of its courts arbitrarily ordered a pro se litigant in a 
complex inheritance dispute to undergo psychiatric testing.308 
There are three important distinguishing factors to note when 
considering these latter two cases alongside the case of Mr. Nemtsov. 
The first is that neither claim concerns the use of national media to 
defame the individual claimant.309 The second factor is that in no case 
is the claimant alleged to have engaged in a conspiracy, or in conduct 
generally, of such enormity as to threaten the nation, as in the case of 
Mr. Nemtsov.310 The third point is that the State acts that implicated 
                                                                                                             
305. Hum. Rts. Comm. Communication No. 1958/2010 (A.M.H. El Hojouj Jum’a et al. 
v. Libya), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/111/D/1958/2010 (July 21, 2014); Hum. Rts. Comm. 
Communication No. 1922/2009 (Martinez, et al. v. Algeria), U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/109/D/1922/2009 (Oct. 28, 2013); Hum. Rts. Comm. Communication No. 1619/2007 
(Pestaño v. The Philippines), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/98/D/1619/2007 (Mar. 23, 2010); Hum. Rts. 
Comm. Communication No. 1450/2006 (Komarovski v. Turkmenistan), U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/93/D/1450/2006 (July 24, 2008); Hum. Rts. Comm. Communication No. 1482/2006 
(M.G. v. Germany), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/93/D/1482/2006 (July 23, 2008); and Hum. Rts. 
Comm. Communication No. 852/1999 (Borisenko v. Hungary), U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/76/D/852/1999 (Oct. 14, 2002). 
306. See Hum. Rts. Comm. Communication No. 1450/2006, supra note 305. 
307. Hum. Rts. Comm. Communication No. 1619/2007, supra note 305. 
308. Hum. Rts. Comm. Communication No. 1482/2006, supra note 305. 
309. See generally Hum. Rts. Comm. Communication No. 1619/2007, supra note 305; 
Hum. Rts. Comm. Communication No. 1482/2006, supra note 305. 
310. See generally Hum. Rts. Comm. Communication No. 1619/2007, supra note 305; 
Hum. Rts. Comm. Communication No. 1482/2006, supra note 305. 
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the following individuals’ honor or reputation did so indirectly by 
way of social stigma attached to a claim or representation about the 
target, not directly with allegations concerning the individual’s 
credibility.311 All the same, the Committee found that States Parties 
arbitrarily or unlawfully interfered with the privacy, honor, and 
reputation of these claimants. The intention of this part of the 
subsection is to show, with all due respect to the authors of the 
Communications under discussion, that the Committee has found 
violations of Article 17 where interferences with an individual’s 
honor and reputation are of significantly lower gravity than the 
Russian media’s attacks on the honor and reputation of Mr. 
Nemtsov.312 
The case of Komarovski v. Turkmenistan is similar to Mr. 
Nemtsov’s case in that State media made explicit defamatory 
allegations against the claimant.313 Leonid Komarovski, its author, is 
an ethnically Russian United States citizen.314 While in the Turkmen 
capital Ashgabat on business, Mr. Komarovski was arrested on 
charges that he was connected to an assassination attempt on 
President for Life of Turkmenistan, Saparmurad Niyazov 
(“Türkmenbaşy”).315 
Türkmenbaşy’s motorcade was alleged to have been fired upon 
two days after Mr. Komarovski’s arrival in Ashgabat.316 After the 
apparent assassination attempt, Türkmenbaşy announced on national 
                                                                                                             
311. Even though in Hum. Rts. Comm. Communication No. 1482/2006, supra note 305, 
the point of the psychiatric exam seems to have been to undermine the individual’s credibility. 
See Hum. Rts. Comm. Communication No. 1482/2006, supra note 305, ¶ 2.6 (“[T]he 
Ellwangen Regional Court  ...  had ordered her medical examination without objective reasons 
and without a prior oral hearing.”). 
312. See generally Hum. Rts. Comm. Communication No. 1619/2007, supra note 305; 
Hum. Rts. Comm. Communication No. 1482/2006 supra note 305. 
313. Hum. Rts. Comm. Communication No. 1450/2006, supra note 305, ¶ 3.8 (“The 
author further claims to be a victim of a violation of article 17, paragraph 1 of the Covenant in 
that, at the end of 2003, the State party’s government published a book, allegedly written by 
him, containing the official version of the events of 25 November 2002. On several occasions 
the author has publicly stated that he did not write the book, is unfamiliar with its contents and 
does not have copyright in it, despite the copyright symbol appearing next to his name. He 
never signed any contract with the State party’s authorities allowing them to use his name on 
any publication or to publish or sell anything under his name. The existence of this book 
constitutes an unlawful attack on his honour and reputation.”). 
314. Id. ¶ 1.1 
315. Id. ¶ 2.5-2.6 (describing the general details of Mr. Komarovski's detention). 
316. Id. ¶ 2.4 (describing the purported assassination attempt on Türkmenbaşy). 
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television that leaders of the Turkmen Popular Democratic Movement 
(“NDDT”), an opposition party, were responsible.317 Mr. Komarovski 
was arrested shortly thereafter while in the home of an associate who 
had some connection to the NDDT leadership that is not made clear in 
the Committee View.318 Mr. Komarovski was held incommunicado 
for one week before United States officials were notified of his 
arrest.319 Turkmen law enforcement held him for roughly another five 
months thereafter, beating and drugging him in detention.320 After 
being injected against his consent with an unknown narcotic, Mr. 
Komarovski was filmed admitting to participation in an attempted 
coup d’état against the Türkmenbaşy government; the video was 
broadcast on national television.321 He asserted no recollection of the 
confession. 322  Mr. Komarovski was eventually released following 
“the intervention of the United States Embassy.”323 In addition to the 
national broadcast of Mr. Komarovski’s “confession,” Turkmen 
authorities published a book that they alleged to have been authored 
by Mr. Komarovski, detailing his participation in the attempt on the 
life of Türkmenbaşy.324 Mr. Komarovski asserted no involvement in 
the writing or publication of the book.325 
In addition to several claims related to his arbitrary detention, 
Mr. Komarovski asserted that Turkmenistan had unlawfully interfered 
with his reputation under Article 17 by way of the publication of the 
                                                                                                             
317. Id. ¶ 2.4 (noting the accusations against Mr. Komarovski on national television). 
318. Id. ¶ 2.5 
319. Id. ¶ 2.8 (“During the entire detention period, the author was not allowed to contact 
his family in writing or over the phone, or receive their visit. He was held incommunicado for 
the first seven days of detention, before the US embassy [sic] in Ashgabat was notified of his 
detention.”). 
320. Id. ¶¶ 2.8-2.11 (noting author’s detention from December 2002 to April 2003). 
321. Id. ¶ 2.9 (“[A]fter his release, he was shown a video of himself admitting to be a 
drug addict and to have participated in the plot against the President. He does not remember 
having made this statement, which was broadcast on 18 December 2002 on Turkmen Public 
Television.”). 
322. Id. 
323. Id. ¶ 2.11 (“On 15 April 2003, following the intervention of the United States 
Embassy, the author was released by Presidential Pardon. At the end of 2003, the Turkmen 
authorities published a book, allegedly written by the author, in which he admits his 
participation in the attempted assassination of the President. The author denies having written 
this book.”). 
324. Id. 
325. Id. 
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book.326 In the most succinct paragraph of the Views, the Committee 
holds that the false portrayal of Mr. Komarovski in a book confirming 
the “official version” of the assassination attempt constituted an 
unlawful interference with his honor and reputation, in violation of 
Article 17 of the ICCPR.327 Regardless of the additional claims, the 
Committee found a violation of Article 17 based on that single State 
act of defamation against the claimant.328 
In Pestaño v. The Philippines, the authors’ son was one of 
several sailors in the Philippine Navy who died under mysterious 
circumstances in 1995 after refusing to participate in a massive drug-
smuggling operation.329 The Philippine Navy stated officially that the 
authors’ son had committed suicide, but buried him in the national 
military cemetery with full honors despite a Navy policy barring such 
treatment for suicides.330 The authors’ son’s life insurance paid out his 
coverage in full, apparently not believing that the cause of death was 
suicide.331 
Following the disappearances of two associates of the authors’ 
son, members of the Philippine Senate ordered an inquiry into the 
case. 332  Subsequently, a vice-admiral of the Philippine Navy 
intervened in the case on two occasions.333 First, he requested that the 
                                                                                                             
326. Id. ¶ 3.8 (“The author further claims to be a victim of a violation of article 17, 
paragraph 1 of the Covenant in that, at the end of 2003, the State party’s government published 
a book, allegedly written by him, containing the official version of the events of 25 November 
2002.”). 
327. Id. ¶ 7.7 (“Finally, the publication of a book confirming the official version of the 
events of 25 November 2002 which falsely portrays the author as the writer of the book, 
constitutes, in the absence of relevant information from the State party, an unlawful 
interference with the author’s privacy and an unlawful attack against his honour and 
reputation, in violation of article 17, paragraph 1, of the Covenant.”). 
328. Id. 
329. See Hum. Rts. Comm. Communication No. 1619/2007, supra note 305, ¶¶ 2.2-2.5 
(relaying the chronology of the authors’ son’s death and burial). 
330. Id. ¶ 2.5 (“On 30 September 1995, the authors’ son was buried in the National 
Cemetery for military personnel and given full military honours, despite a Navy policy stating 
that suicide victims should not benefit from such treatment.”). 
331. Id. ¶ 2.7 (“In the course of the same month, after conducting its own inquiry, and 
despite the official Navy and police conclusions, the victim’s insurance company paid the full 
amount of his coverage to his beneficiaries for his death.”). 
332 . Id. ¶ 2.10 (“On 15 November 1995, two Senators filed a Senate Resolution, 
directing the appropriate Senate Committees to conduct an inquiry into the circumstances 
surrounding the death of the authors’ son.”). 
333. Id. ¶ 2.11 (“In December 1995, the State party’s Navy Flag Officer in Command, a 
Vice-Admiral, invited the authors to dinner, and requested that they refrain from pursuing their 
 
2016] THE CASE FOR BORIS NEMTSOV 1343 
authors “refrain from pursuing” their son’s case.334 On the second 
occasion, the official threatened to cancel a contract between the 
authors and the Philippine Navy worth PHP100,000,000 if they 
pursued the case.335 After refusing to abandon the case, all four of the 
Philippine Navy ships being repaired by the authors’ company 
mysteriously sank, the company’s offices were ransacked, and the 
authors’ nephew, an employee of the company, was killed.336 
Three years later, the Senate investigation concluded that the 
Pestaños’ son was killed other than by suicide.337 However, it was not 
until seven years later still, in 2005, that the case was reopened, only 
to see the lead investigator replaced and the case left 
uninvestigated.338 At the Committee, the Pestaños asserted that the 
elaborate cover-up of their son’s death, including the allegations that 
he had committed suicide, was an unlawful attack on his honor and 
reputation under Article 17. 339  The Committee found that on the 
                                                                                                             
son’s case against the Navy. Two weeks later, the Navy Flag Officer in Command sought to 
see the authors again, and presented the author, Mr. Pestaño, with his company’s contract with 
the Navy, worth a hundred-million pesos, together with an affidavit of waiver and desistance 
to pursue his suit against the Navy.”). 
334. Id. 
335. Id. At that time, PHP100 million was worth US$3,888,870. Bankers Association of 
the Philippines, Exchange Rates > Philippine Peso per US Dollar 1995, 
http://www.bsp.gov.ph/dbank_reports/ExchangeRates_1_rpt.asp?frequency=Annual&range_
from=1995&range_to=1995&conversion=Average. 
336 . Hum. Rts. Comm. Communication No. 1619/2007, supra note 305, ¶ 2.11 
(describing the mysterious events following the Pestaños' refusal to abandon the investigation 
of their son's death). 
337 . Id. ¶ 2.15 (“On 25 January 1998, after eight Committee hearings, a visual 
inspection of the stateroom of the authors’ son in the ship, and relying, inter alia, on expert 
evidence5 and witness testimonies, two Senate Committees issued a Joint report on the 
Pestaño case, which contained the following findings: (i) The authors’ son did not kill himself 
on the BRP Bacolod City on 27 September 1995; (ii) he was shot in one place in the vessel 
different from the one where his body was found; (iii) after his death, his body was moved and 
laid on the bed where it was found; (iv) he must have been shot on board the BRP Bacolod 
City before the vessel reached the Navy Headquarters on 27 September 1995; (v) there was a 
deliberate attempt to make it appear that the authors’ son killed himself inside his stateroom; 
and (vi) such an attempt was so deliberate and elaborate that one person could not have 
accomplished it by himself.”). 
338. Id. ¶ 2.17 (“[T]he case was left uninvestigated in the Office of the Ombudsman for 
military affairs.”). 
339. Id. ¶ 3.2 (“[The authors] recall the Senate Committee’s findings of 1998, which 
they believe conclusively established that their son did not commit suicide, but was murdered. 
They add that there was a deliberate and elaborate conspiracy to cover-up his death, including 
through fabrication destruction or tampering of evidence, as well as misrepresentation and 
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merits, the Philippines’ attempt to make it appear that the authors’ son 
had committed suicide, when in fact he had clearly been murdered, 
was an unlawful attack on his honor.340 
In M.G. v. Germany, the author, Ms. M.G., had been ordered to 
undergo a psychological examination to determine whether she was 
fit to litigate on her own behalf in an inheritance dispute.341  She 
demonstrated that existing physical ailments had been exacerbated by 
the stress of handling what appeared to be a complex and contentious 
case pro se. 342  Ms. M.G. filed a complaint against the court that 
ordered the exam; it was rejected without explanation.343 Ms. M.G. 
submitted to the Committee that the decision to subject her to a 
medical examination without objective reasons and without a hearing 
was an unlawful interference with her privacy under Article 17.344 
The Committee went further in its Views, holding that the social 
stigma and potential reputational consequences of psychological 
illness made the interference with Ms. M.G.’s privacy 
disproportionate to the end sought, and therefore an arbitrary 
interference with her honor and reputation under Article 17.345 
The Committee tends to use soft language when determining 
recourse for individuals in whose favor it has ruled. For example, in 
Komarovski v. Turkmenistan, the Committee ordered Turkmenistan 
to provide Mr. Komarovski with an “effective remedy,” as well as to 
prosecute individuals behind the violations of his rights, pay him 
“reparations,” and also make a public retraction of the claims related 
to the book.346 The Committee will generally not order the payment of 
money damages, in contrast to the European Court — which is 
discussed in the following section. 
                                                                                                             
distortion of facts, all of which constituted an obstruction of justice, and an unlawful attack 
against the authors’ son honour.”). 
340. Id. ¶ 6.6 (“The Committee notes that the authors’ claim under article 17 paragraph 
1, to the effect that the State party’s attempt to make it appear that the victim committed 
suicide, is to be construed as an unlawful attack against his honour.”). 
341. Hum. Rts. Comm. Communication No. 1482/2006, supra note 305, ¶¶ 2.1-2.2. 
342. Id. ¶ 2.5 (giving background on Ms. M.G.'s case). 
343. Id. ¶ 2.4. 
344. Id. ¶ 2.5. 
345. Id. ¶¶ 10.1-10.2. 
346. Hum. Rts. Comm. Communication No. 1450/2006, supra note 305, ¶ 9. 
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3. Interference with Private Life at the European Court 
This Section considers four successful reputation-related claims 
at the European Court. In comparison with the scarcity of Article 17 
Committee Views, the European Court of Human Rights has ruled on 
over one thousand Article 8 (privacy) claims against States Parties to 
the Convention.347 Russia is the fourth-most-sued State on privacy 
claims at the European Court. 348  A search of “reputation” within 
European Court judgments that includes Article 8 violations returns 
104 results.349 To find an invasion of privacy, the European Court 
looks to whether the invasion was both lawful and “necessary in a 
democratic society.”350 However, as these cases show, the European 
Court does not directly address reputation — it includes damage to 
reputation as a possible corollary of improper invasions of privacy.351 
For that reason, none of the following cases can be read on point with 
the case of Mr. Nemtsov in the way of, for example, Komarovski v. 
Turkmenistan at the Committee. 
The pair of cases Kolesnichenko v. Russia and Yuditskaya and 
Others v. Russia saw privacy complaints follow law enforcement 
mistreatment of lawyers in Perm, a small city 1,400 kilometers (870 
miles) east of Moscow.352 In Kolesnichenko v. Russia, the applicant, 
Aleksey Kolesnichenko, was accused of forging documents for a 
criminal defendant he was representing, resulting in the issuance of 
warrants to search his apartment and that of his parents. 353  In 
Yuditskaya and Others v. Russia, the applicant’s law firm was raided 
when one of its lawyers, on a frolic of his own, was caught forging a 
contract in order to cover up a bribery scheme to which he was 
otherwise not party.354 
                                                                                                             
347. Decisions Concerning Article 8, supra note 255.  
348 . Id. (showing 135 reported cases against Italy, 101 against Poland, 96 against 
Turkey, and 88 against Russia). 
349. Id. (in “VIOLATION,” select “8;” enter keyword “reputation”). 
350. ECHR, supra note 7, at art. 8 (“There shall be no interference by a public authority 
with the exercise of” the right to privacy and family life “except such as is in accordance with 
the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public 
safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for 
the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”) 
351. Id. 
352. See generally Yuditskaya and Others v. Russia, App. No. 5678/06 Eur. Ct. H.R. 
(2015); see also Kolesnichenko v. Russia, App. No. 19856/04 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009). 
353. Kolesnichenko, supra note 352, ¶¶ 8-10. 
354. Yuditskaya, supra note 352, ¶¶ 8-10. 
1346 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 39:1289 
The European Court did not directly consider reputation in either 
case, and neither applicant submitted that interference with or damage 
to reputation was the basis of the alleged Article 8 violation.355 Mr. 
Kolesnichenko’s claim was exclusively related to the inviolability of 
the home, while Yuditskaya et al similarly alleged an Article 8 
violation due to unreasonable search and seizure.356 As in the other 
European Court cases examined below, the Court brought up the 
question of reputation sua sponte, and, anyway, in passing.357 In both 
cases, the Court found that investigators had acted with unrestricted, 
and therefore unreasonable, discretion in the searches in question.358 
Among other reasons, while at least considering damage to reputation 
as a corollary, the Court found the searches to be unreasonable and 
therefore to have been violative of Article 8.359 
One case considers the reputational consequences of direct State 
action. In Sõro v. Estonia, applicant Mihhail Sõro was an Estonian 
national who had been employed by the Soviet security and 
intelligence services (“KGB”) as a driver during the period of Soviet 
occupation of the Baltic States including Estonia.360 In 2004, thirteen 
years after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and ten years after the 
withdrawal of Russian military personnel from Estonia, Mr. Sõro’s 
employment with the KGB during the years 1980-91 was made public 
pursuant to an Estonian statute.361  
While Estonia asserted the necessity of rooting out agents of the 
country’s former occupiers, Mr. Sõro responded that he was only a 
driver, was not involved in any intelligence-gathering activities, and 
was forced out of his job as a result of Estonia’s official publication 
of his status as a KGB employee – despite the fact that he had always 
disclosed it when applying for work.362 In 2007, the Tallinn Court of 
Appeals, the Estonian appellate court deciding against Mr. Sõro, held 
that, essentially, he was to be assumed guilty of collaboration with an 
occupier because establishing his innocence would be too difficult 
                                                                                                             
355. Yuditskaya, supra note 352; Kolesnichenko, supra note 352. 
356. Yuditskaya, supra note 352, ¶ 3; Kolesnichenko, supra note 352, ¶ 3. 
357. Yuditskaya, supra note 352, ¶ 28; Kolesnichenko, supra note 352, ¶ 31. 
358. Yuditskaya, supra note 352,  ¶ 29; Kolesnichenko, supra note 352, ¶ 33. 
359. Yuditskaya, supra note 352, ¶ 2; Kolesnichenko, supra note 352, at Judgment, ¶ 2. 
360. Sõro v. Estonia, App. No. 22588/08 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2015) ¶ 3. 
361. Id. ¶ 19. 
362. Id. ¶ 30. 
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given the passage of time since his employment with the KGB.363 The 
Tallinn Court stated in this same ruling, though, that official 
publication of Mr. Sõro’s status as former a KGB employee was 
inherently defamatory.364 The European Court, reading the Tallinn 
Court’s judgment, found the Estonian statute requiring public 
disclosure of KGB affiliation to have a “punitive character on top of 
its alleged preventive purpose.”365 
Mr. Sõro asserted that while he had never faced problems with 
employment despite disclosing his past as a KGB driver, he was 
treated as “an occupier, a traitor, a snitch among his colleagues and 
acquaintances” following Estonia’s official publication of that 
status.366 In ruling on the merits, the European Court found that the 
public disclosure included facts about Mr. Sõro’s past that had the 
capacity to negatively impact his reputation.367 The Court also found 
that the interference was lawful in theory, but was applied 
arbitrarily.368 In that connection, it found a violation of Article 8.369 
In Khmel v. Russia, the applicant was a regional legislator who 
threw a protracted temper tantrum in a police station following his 
midday arrest on drunk driving charges. 370  After being released 
following his refusal to take a sobriety test, and once his status as 
regional Duma deputy had been established, Aleksandr Khmel not 
only verbally abused police officers at the precinct, but also threw his 
shoes at them and proceeded to unload desk drawers onto the floor.371 
Despite his release, Mr. Khmel refused to leave the station, “wreaking 
havoc,” in the words of the Court.372  As this was happening, the 
police chief informed local television media of the incident, and 
cameramen came to the station to catch it on film.373 It was shown the 
following day during a news broadcast to viewers in Murmansk, Mr. 
Khmel’s constituent region.374 In his complaint, Mr. Khmel asserted 
                                                                                                             
363. Id. ¶ 32. 
364. Id. at n.38. 
365. Id. 
366. Id. ¶ 53. 
367. See id. ¶ 56. 
368. See id. ¶ 57, 61. 
369. See id. ¶ 63-64. 
370. See Khmel v. Russia, App. No. 20383/04 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2013), ¶ 5. 
371. See id. ¶¶ 6-8. 
372. Id. ¶¶ 46. 
373. See id. ¶¶ 8-9. 
374. See id. ¶¶ 6, 11. 
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that in addition to being filmed against his consent, the sole purpose 
of the broadcast was to tarnish his reputation.375 
The European Court addressed various aspects of the incident, 
but in connection to the Article 8 section of the complaint, focused on 
the filming and broadcast of Mr. Khmel without his consent.376 First 
and foremost, the Court noted that the concept of private life extends 
to “aspects relating to personal identity, such as a person’s name or 
image.” 377  In its discussion of the interference with Mr. Khmel’s 
privacy, the European Court held that such interference must be “in 
accordance with the law,” that being the domestic law of the State 
Party defendant, and also be “necessary in a democratic society.”378 
The Court found that since the first requirement was not met, it was 
unnecessary to explore the second.379 One law the European Court 
examined, and with which the interference would need to be in 
accordance, was Article 38 of the Russian Law on Mass Media, 
discussed previously in this Note.380 
Despite Mr. Khmel’s “disorderly and violent” behavior in 
custody, the European Court still found that the filming and broadcast 
of the video against his consent, and which had the potential to 
damage his reputation, violated Article 8.381 That is, even where the 
media’s dissemination of damaging information about a public 
official was true, the Court found a violation of Article 8 where the 
dissemination was unlawful.382 In this way, at least, Khmel v. Russia 
should be persuasive to the Court should it be faced with a defamation 
claim by representatives of Mr. Nemtsov. 
In three of the Article 8 cases discussed here, the European 
Court awarded claimants four-figure euro sums including pecuniary 
and non-pecuniary damages as well as costs. 383  In Yuditskaya v. 
Russia, the applicants did not submit a claim for just satisfaction, and 
                                                                                                             
375. See id. ¶ 39. 
376. See id. ¶ 36. 
377. Id. ¶ 40. 
378. Id. ¶ 45. 
379. See id. ¶ 51. 
380. See id. ¶ 16. See also supra Section II(2)(d) (discussing Article 38 of the Russian 
Law on Mass Media).  
381. See Khmel, supra note 370, ¶¶ 46, 52. 
382. See id. ¶ 49. 
383. See id. at Judgment, ¶ 4; Sõro, supra note 360, at Judgment, ¶ 3; Kolesnichenko, 
supra note 352, at Judgment, ¶ 3. 
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so the Court awarded them nothing while declaring a violation of 
Article 8 of the ECHR.384 In no case did the European Court call on 
the State Party defendant to take action other than to pay out the 
damages.385 
This Part has explored international human rights litigation on 
reputation and reputation-related questions. At the Committee, this 
includes Komarovski v. Russia, which featured a cause of action on 
point with the case of Mr. Nemtsov — that is, where national media 
was used in a character assassination campaign.386 It also included 
cases where the effects of State acts had reputational implications on 
the claimants that were arguably of far lesser gravity than those of the 
claims made by Russian media that Mr. Nemtsov was at the head of a 
campaign to destabilize his country. 387  In all of these cases, the 
Committee found violations of Article 17 — a good sign for Mr. 
Nemtsov’s case. 388  Further, in all of these cases, the Committee 
ordered the State Party defendant to report on its remedial actions 
going forward.389 
At the European Court, however, cases on point with that of Mr. 
Nemtsov were harder to find. The cases under examination in this 
Part focused on State actions that, as the European Court found it, had 
knock-on effects that included detriment to reputation. While 
mentioning these effects in passing, the rulings that a State Party had 
violated Article 8 of the ECHR tended to rest on privacy violations of 
a different color. And when finding violations, the European Court 
ordered small damages amounts — even in comparison with the 
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damages available for defamation under Russian law — while 
seeking no further action from the State Party.390 
IV: THE DEFAMATION CASE FOR BORIS NEMTSOV 
Media hostility towards Boris E. Nemtsov, in the form of a 
character assassination campaign, grew in proportion to his criticism 
of President Vladimir V. Putin during the two years leading up to his 
murder on February 27, 2015.391 Mr. Nemtsov was alleged to be a 
leader of the so-called “fifth column,” a conspiracy of political 
agitators on the take from non-Russian powers.392 Essentially, these 
media very clearly accused Mr. Nemtsov of treason while providing 
no substantiation for the claims. 393  On one occasion, Mr. Putin 
accused Mr. Nemtsov of large-scale theft of public funds.394 Further, 
the Russian government apparently took no action to force the media 
engaged in attacks on Mr. Nemtsov’s credibility to prove the 
allegations asserted against him or to cease making them. 
Russian statutory law provides robust protections to reputation, 
dignity, and honor in its Constitution, Civil Code, and Criminal 
Code.395 In addition to statutory law, the Russian Supreme Court has 
issued a Plenary Directive on courts’ application of the criminal and 
civil statutes concerning attacks to reputation. 396  Two important 
features of this Directive are a stated bar on statutes of limitations on 
such claims, and, relatedly, express permission of posthumous 
claims.397 
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Mr. Nemtsov unsuccessfully sued Mr. Putin personally on a 
defamation claim while he was still alive. 398  However, given the 
provisions of Russian law outlining media liability for attacks on 
personal dignity and honor, Mr. Nemtsov’s representatives have a 
good case against media outlets that participated in the character 
assassination campaign under discussion here.399 It is not outside the 
realm of possibility that the Russian courts could provide Mr. 
Nemtsov’s representatives with satisfactory recourse. Such recourse 
could potentially include not only money damages, but also 
refutations of unsubstantiated claims against Mr. Nemtsov in the 
media used to make those allegations in the first place, at cost to the 
defendant.400 
Should Mr. Nemtsov’s representatives exhaust the Russian court 
system without a ruling in his favor, they have potential recourse at 
two international tribunals: the European Court of Human Rights, and 
the United Nations Human Rights Committee. 401  The Russian 
Supreme Court expressly includes consideration of European Court 
norms in its application of defamation law, and the Russian 
Federation has reported to the Committee on its incorporation of 
ICCPR understandings of respect for personal dignity, among other 
things, into its federal laws.402 But the tribunals are not created equal 
when it comes to defamation claims. 
There are two important considerations regarding differences 
between the potential and probable outcomes at each tribunal. The 
first is that the Committee more expressly recognizes reputation as a 
separately delineated individual right, given its inclusion in the 
language of Article 17 of the ICCPR.403 The Committee has found in 
favor of claimants asserting victimhood of character assassination 
campaigns in the media of States in Russia’s geopolitical 
neighborhood.404 Meanwhile, cases at the European Court concerning 
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reputation as such are few, as damage to reputation is usually seen in 
that court as an offshoot of violations of privacy; Article 8 of the 
ECHR does not name reputation as a protected right.405 The second 
consideration is that while the European Court awards money 
damages, the amounts are small and the Committee tends to order 
States to follow up and provide other recourse to applicants asserting 
violations of the ICCPR.406 In the case of Mr. Nemtsov, this could 
include enforcement of Russia’s very strong anti-defamation statutes 
to Mr. Nemtsov’s benefit. 
If past Article 8 (privacy) actions including damage to reputation 
at the European Court are a guide, the Court is likely to award Mr. 
Nemtsov’s representatives money damages.407 Though the example 
cases explored in this Note do not consider reputation as the 
foundational right of the claim, Mr. Nemtsov’s case is so obvious that 
the Court would be very likely to read a violation of privacy into the 
reputational effects of the Russian media campaign on Mr. Nemtsov’s 
private life. One way, for example, would be to cite the multiple 
observer claims that the very media atmosphere in question was a 
proximate cause of Mr. Nemtsov’s assassination. 408  Where State 
ownership of complicit media could be established, the European 
Court would need to find that the interference with Mr. Nemtsov’s 
privacy was unlawful — which, as shown supra, it would be under 
Russian law — and unnecessary in a democratic society. Establishing 
neither of these would be difficult. 
Meanwhile, at the Committee, Mr. Nemtsov’s representatives 
would not need to show State action directing the media campaign in 
question, or even State ownership of the media.409 This is because 
Article 17 of the ICCPR creates an obligation on States Parties to 
protect their nationals against interference with their reputation.410 
The Committee would be likely to order the Russian Federation to 
                                                                                                             
405. See ECHR, supra note 7, at art. 8. 
406. Compare supra Part III.2 with supra Part III.3. 
407. See supra notes 383-85 and accompanying text. 
408. See Nechepurenko, supra note 5; Lipman, supra note 5. 
409. See ICCPR, supra note 7, at art. 17.  
410. See id. 
2016] THE CASE FOR BORIS NEMTSOV 1353 
“remedy” the situation concerning Mr. Nemtsov’s reputation; Russian 
federal law features various reasonable methods of doing so.411 
CONCLUSION 
Without taking any position on unsubstantiated allegations of 
Kremlin involvement in the February 2015 assassination of Russian 
opposition elder statesman Boris E. Nemtsov, it is the project of this 
Note to demonstrate the strength of a defamation case on Mr. 
Nemtsov’s behalf in Russian and international courts. The case is 
strong, in fact, regardless of his murder, and is based on the character 
assassination campaign directed against Mr. Nemtsov in response to 
his exposure of malversation and sharp criticism of Russian foreign 
policy. 412  The federal laws of the Russian Federation provide 
extensive civil and criminal remedies for defamation, with expanded 
liability when the media is used to slanderous ends. If the Russian 
courts do not rule in Mr. Nemtsov’s favor, the case may and should 
continue internationally given Russia’s ratification of two 
international treaties creating human rights tribunals. 
Given the differences in damage procedures, though, the United 
Nations Human Rights Committee is the preferable tribunal. 
However, Mr. Nemtsov’s representatives would have a very strong 
case regardless of which international court they choose to litigate 
with a view to restoring his honor. Given the protections to dignity 
and honor in Russian law, and the domestic exhaustion requirements 
in the international courts, they should start their suit in Russia. Also, 
given the Russian Supreme Court’s bar on statutes of limitations and 
permission of posthumous defamation claims, they would be able to 
take as much time as possible to gather information beyond the scope 
of this Note to make their case in the domestic court system. No 
matter what, the right to reputation is protected by law both in Russia 
and internationally, and, therefore, the case for Boris Nemtsov is 
clear. 
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